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INTRODUCTION 
By Dan Schneiderman 
Project Manager, hiariner-Mars Mission 
This technical report is a series of individual papers documenting 
the Mariner-Mars project from its beginning in 1962 following the 
successful Mariner-Venus mission. Part I is pre-encounter data. It 
iiicludes papers on the design, deveIopinent, and testing of Mariner IV, 
as well as papers detailing methods of maintaining coinmunication 
with and obtaining data froin the spacecraft during flight, and ex- 
pected results during encounter with Mars. Part 11, post-encozinter 
data, to be published later, will consist of documentation of the events 
taking place during Mariner IV’s encounter with Mars and thereafter. 
The Mariner-Mars mission, the culmination of an era of spacecraft 
development, has contributed inuch new technology to be used in 
future projects. 
I 
Managing the 
Mariner Mars Project 
By JACK N. JAMES 
Acting Assistant Laboratory Director, Lunar and Planetary Projects. JPL 
Reprinted from ASTRFNAUTICS & AERONAUTICS, Augwf 1965 
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Managing the 
Mariner Mars Project 
By JACK N. JAMES 
Acting Assistant Laboratory Director, Lunar and Planetary Projects, JPL 
The rules of order imposed in this development brought the best out 
of everyone who supported the project, while keeping hard and 
fast commitments for a complex spacecraft mission 
Management can easily become an impersonal 
tool. By extending the practices of Ranger and 
the Mariner Venus 1962 projects to the Mariner 
Mars 1964 Project (MM64), we think it cut 
through the tough problems that confront any 
major engineering development. 
To apply their experience, many individuals 
stepped directly into MM64 upon completion of 
the 11-month, crash Mariner Venus effort. 
This article recounts important management 
features of MM64. It  is not presumed that they 
constitute a panacea for other projects; and if they 
seem obvious, then perhaps that is what made 
them significant. 
Projects are not started from scratch. They 
generally are preceded by a variety of important 
study and proposal efforts that probe related and 
frequently more-ambitious efforts. Such was the 
case for MM64. In the summer of 1962, about the 
time of launching Mariner 2 to Venus, it became 
evident to NASA and JPL that a more ambitious 
Centaur-based launch to Mars in the fall of 1964 
would not be possible, as the Centaur launch vehi- 
cle would not be ready. Studies were initiated by 
JPL and other NASA centers to determine what 
kind of mission might be achieved based on the 
operational Atlas-Agena launch vehicle. In No- 
vember 1962, NASA approved a mission-concept 
proposal by the JPL and authorized the MM64 
Project. NASA authorized two launches owing to 
the risk associated with the mission and the safety 
provided by vehicle redundancy. 
With the approval of the Project, five major 
actions were taken concurrently: 
I .  Ordering Long-Lead-Time Parts. Since the 
brief launch opportunity to Mars was to occur two 
years to the month after Project approval, an im- 
mediate survey of certain subsystems was neces- 
sary to initiate procurement for long-lead-time 
parts. This was possible, even though the sys- 
tem design had not been completed, because the 
MM64 effort was, in most cases, an extrapolation 
from the technological base established with Mari- 
ner 2 and its predecessor design, Ranger. 
2. System Design. The conceptual and prelimi- 
nary spacecraft design work that had been under- 
way sufficiently demonstrated feasibility, but it 
was hardly an adequate reference from which to 
initiate hard subsystem design; so the study was 
reformed into a Spacecraft System design effort. 
A system-design team was formed, composed of 
some 30 of the best engineers available, repre- 
senting ail of the JPL discipiine activities con- 
tributing to the design. 
The output of this effort was to be the Space- 
craft Design Specifications (SDS) Book, the gov- 
erning document for the spacecraft throughout the 
life of the Project. The team was given three 
months, untii February 1963, to produce it. 
The book, in three parts, represents control by 
three different levels in the Project’s organizational 
structure. 
Part I, “Mission Objectives and Design Cri- 
teria,” very brief, is prepared and controlled by the 
Project Manager. 
Part 11, “Spacecraft Design Characteristics and 
Restraints,” is prepared by the Spacecraft System 
Manager and his Project Engineer and controlled 
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by the Spacecraft System Manager. 
Part 111, “Spacecraft Function Specifications,” 
contains some 40 subsystem and spacecraft-related 
specifications prepared by the JPL Technical Divi- 
sions and controlled by the Project Engineer. 
Every effort on a project can influence its suc- 
cess or failure, including the specific risk at launch; 
but the importance of the system-design team’s 
judgment cannot be overemphasized. At JPL there 
is an attempt to employ on this team many individ- 
uals who will have a continuing responsibility 
throughout the life of the Project. They must fol- 
low through on, and will be held accountable for, 
their early judgments. 
3.  Establishing the Launch Period. For a plan- 
etary flight, the launch period is one of the first 
efforts in mission design that the Project Manager 
must clearly specify. 
As is common knowledge, Mars comes within 
shooting range of Earth every 25 months. The 
launch period depends on the geocentric energy 
(C,) required to reach Mars each day of that 
particular calendar year, the spacecraft injected 
weight, and the ability of the launch vehicle to 
inject the spacecraft to the required velocity. 
Each of these three areas was examined quickly 
by mission analysts; the project leaders had to take 
a firm stand on spacecraft weight and launch- 
vehicle requirements very early, based on judg- 
ment as to what would be achievable in the time 
available with a balancing of risks. 
Analysis of launch-attempt statistics indicatcd 
the launch period should be 18 days at the mini- 
mum and 44 days the desirable. Less than 44 days 
required preparing two launch pads at Cape Ken- 
nedy. The 44 days represented a hedge against a 
prior, non-project abort eliminating one of the two 
pads. The two project launches could then still be 
conducted sequentially off the remaining pad. A 
long launch period also gave time to correct any 
failure cropping up in the first launch. 
In view of this, two pads were established at the 
outset in the Program Requirements Document, 
the official means for placing requirements on 
the Air Force Eastern Test Range (AFETR) at 
Cape Kennedy. 
Energy for a launch to Mars in 1964 did not 
differ much from the 1962 Venus flight. But the 
spacecraft weight had to increase by 131 Ib. The 
Atlas/Agena launch vehicle therefore had to be 
further modified over its 1962 performance for the 
mission. (It had already been uprated to meet the 
1962 Venus requirements.) A “shopping list” of 
desirable performance changes-some were al- . 
ready being considered-was developed for the 
launch vehicle, and an estimate was made of the 
probability of each change being flight-qualified 
in time. 
Spacecraft weight specified by the Project Man- 
ager in Part I of the SDS Book was 570 Ib. 
The actual Mariner 4 weight injected was 575.37 
Ib. The launch vehicle also met its minimum C ,  of 
10.2 kms2/sec2. 
Weight and performance control engineers ex- 
changed published estimates on a monthly basis. 
Progress was tracked, and weight-saving drives 
instituted from time to time. 
To achieve this spacecraft weight, designers had 
to take extreme measures. For example, the panels 
to which the solar cells were bonded were 0.003 
in. thick. Indeed, the spacecraft structure proved 
so fragile that a special training film was prepared 
for all personnel involved in its handling. Mariner 
2 and MM64 compare in basic piece-parts, such as 
~~ 
’, fasteners, transistors, and so forth, as follows: 
Spacecraft Piece-part count Injected wt, Ib Partdlb . 
Mariner 2 54,000 444 12 1 
(Venus) 
Mariner 4 138,000 575 240 
(Mars) 
-_ lne  graph at bottom shows ihe aciuai iaiiiicii 
period achieved employing both trajectories that 
extend less than halfway around the Sun (Type I) 
and trajectories extending greater than one-half 
way (Type 11). This launch period amounted to 
28 days. A project of any kind may well slip one 
month after being underway for two years. A slip 
of one month in the MM64 Project would have 
meant failure. One of the functions of project 
management was to keep schedule discipline. 
A specially assigned engineer maintained the 
planning document on launch constraints as an 
advisory function to the Project. He collected, 
studied, and summarized all design or policy fac- 
tors that constrained in any way the launch pe- 
riod and the launch window on each day of the 
period. His advisory function extended right 
through the critical launch countdowns, advising 
the Project Manager of the impact of such factors 
as weather and tracking-station outage on the 
launch window. 
4.  The Project Development Plan. Shortly after 
its formation by the Space Act of 1958, NASA 
recognized that it needed a mechanism for mar- 
shalling the diversified talents of the NASA centers 
to meet a project objective. For this reason it 
drafted and issued NASA Management Instruc- 
tion (NMI) 4-1-1. A project must draw upon, 
and force into a complementary shape, many 
ongoing programs and R&D efforts-many of 
which tend towards standardization. The Project 
Manager needs the edge of authority to force the 
pieces of a project to complement each other; for 
when challenging mission objectives have been set 
forth, you can be sure the pieces won’t fit. The 
“pieces” of the Project are identified by NMI 
4-1-1 to be “systems.” Each system was to have a 
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System Manager, with similar responsibility. 
The authority the Project Manager needed was 
established in NMI 4-1-1 by requiring that System 
Managers comply with his decision; if they ob- 
jected, to appeal-but meanwhile to comply. Thus 
NASA recognized that such authority was the 
“grease” necessary to cause projects to move 
ahead. NMI 4-1-1 calls for a Project Development 
Plan (PDP) to be prepared, negotiated, and signed 
first by the Project Manager and then by the Sys- 
tem Managers and authorities at NASA Headquar- 
ters. The PDP outlines the mission objectives, 
conceptual design, cost and manpower estimates, 
and special requirements, and it divides the job 
into systems and states which system performs 
which functions. A clear assigning of the tasks 
among systems is necessary at the outset of a proj- 
ect to save time. The chart on page 37 summarizes 
the system assignments for MM64. 
As shown, Project Management and three of the 
four systems were assigned to JPL. The launch- 
vehicle system was assigned to Lewis Research 
Center. A major interface exists between the Proj- 
ect as a whole and the Air Force Eastern Test 
Range. Additionally, the Project Manager reported 
into NASA Headquarters through the NASA Pro- 
gram Manager assigned to MM64. The NASA 
Program Management function was also estab- 
lished by NMI 4-1-1. For Mariner, it provided an 
excellent management environment. 
5.  Policy and Requirements Document (PRD). 
The MM64 Project exploited the talents of the JPL 
discipline divisions to carry out the Project Man- 
agement, Spacecraft, Space Flight Operations 
(SFO), and Deep Space Instrumentation Facility 
(DSIF) system assignments. 
The Project engaged the JPL Divisions in a 
matrix organization, and the effort was coqducted 
in an “in-house” fashion. That is, the Project 
levied its policies and requirements on the JPL 
Technical Divisions, what it wanted and by when. 
The Divisions engaged subcontractors who best 
complemented their talents. This approach in- 
volved a variety of subcontractors having special 
capabilities; and indeed, 75% of the funds au- 
thorized to JPL went to these subcontractors. 
The means by which the policies and require- 
ments of the Project were levied upon the JPL 
Divisions was the PRD-a management document 
authored by the Project Manager and two assist- 
ants. It established the obligations of each Divi- 
sion and the means of organizational interfacing 
with the Project. 
This PRD, the keystone for the Project through- 
out its life, stressed clarity and simplicity to mini- 
mize misunderstanding as to what was wanted. 
Sixty pages long, it described the number of equip- 
ments to be built, assembled and tested, configura- 
tion control, quality control, parts control, test 
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requirements, key planning and control documents 
required, procurement requirements, organiza- 
tion, and schedule control. The document covered 
virtually every aspect of the Project and its every 
sentence packed meaning. Yet it was intentionally 
held to a relatively few pages so that everyone 
working on the Project could easily become 
thoroughly familiar with it, and this they were 
enjoined to do. 
The more complicated the Project, the more 
complicated the communication problems among 
people-and thus the more strenuous an effort man- 
agement should make to simplify the guideline 
requirements, to ensure that an informed team 
moves towards the same goal and to permit an 
easier measuring of achievements. In MM64 it 
was necessary time and time again to reconfirm 
the basic guidelines and requirements to bring 
about their understanding. And it was made very 
hard to modify the basic requirements. 
Once these five actions were mrried out-order- 
ing long-lead-time parts, initiating system design, 
establishing the launch period, making the PDP, 
and enacting the PRD-the Project was moving 
ahead on all fronts. Let’s look now at some of the 
subsequent actions. 
Organization and JPL Meetings. Only three 
individuals reported administratively to the Proj- 
ect Manager-two Assistant Project Managers and 
7SYSTEM MANAGER 
1. DSlF DEV. AND PROCUREMENT 
2. DSlF DOCUMENTATION 
3. DSlF RELIABILITY 
4. UIRANGE FOR DSlF OPERATIONS 
5. OPERATE DSlF IN SUPPORT Of 
CREWS 
S/C MISSIONS 
SPACEFUGHT OPERATION 
SYSTEM MANAGR 
1. DEVELOPMENT OF SPACEfLlGHT 
2. SCIENTIFIC DATA COOIDINATION 
OPERATIONS P U N  
AND PREPMATION FOR 
DISSEMINATION 
3. POST-FLIGHT TW. CALCUUTIONS 
4. DEV. OF SPECIAL COMkVIND EQUIP. 
5. ENGINEERING TELEMEIKY EVU. 
6. CONDUCT SPACE FLIGHT om. 
a Fiscal Assistant. At the peak of the effort some 
1200 individuals worked on the Project at JPL, 
as shown in the manpower curve at the bottom. 
Division Representatives to MM64 constituted the 
Project Manager’s means of utilizing this large 
number of people. By requirement of the PRD, 
each JPL Division assigned such a Representative 
to the Project. He policed the interfaces, moni- 
tored progress, and was the catalyst for MM64 in 
his Division. 
Once a week, for the life of MM64, Project 
Management held a meeting involving the three 
JPL System Managers or their delegates and the 
Division Representatives. Each Division Repre- 
sentative was asked to report briefly what he con- 
sidered to be the most serious problems impeding 
progress. From these reports, action assignments 
were made and carried in meeting minutes until 
the action was completed. 
Although the subject matter was not of interest 
to all Representatives through the entirety of the 
meeting, they were expected to stay to develop a 
broad understanding of the total project. It is 
believed that this was the most important means 
by which a MM64 team was forged. 
Anticipating Crises. For certain, a project will 
encounter crises. One should list the “firsts” being 
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’ attempted in a project to try to anticipate where 
the crises are apt to occur. There follows a rough 
listing of MM64 “firsts” prepared in March 1963 : 
First N A S A  dual launch preparation on two 
18-44-day launch period must be met or mission 
pads. 
fails. 
C h n g e s  ici A ilas D io iiici CXLW peijiiiiiiaiice. 
First N A S A  use of Agena D. 
Changes to Agena D to increase performance. 
First Agena D two-burn employing C / S  system. 
New shroud and ejection system. 
New spacecraft-Agena separation system. 
New spacecraft involving- 
First use of  the star Canopus for attitude 
stabilization. 
First use of S-band communication system. 
First use of dual midcourse maneuver capa- 
bility. 
First mission requiring nine months of suc- 
cessful spacecraft operation to achieve mis- 
sion success. 
To hold schedule, a project must have modest 
reserve resources to commit; the Project Manager 
must have some funds in reserve to buy his way 
out of emergencies. About 6% was held by Proj- 
ect at beginning of each fiscal year on MM64, in 
spite of many forces, from within and from with- 
out the Project, acting against such a reserve. Of 
course, the proper time for committing reserves 
is a matter of judgment. The Project Manager will 
likely need to commit reserves as a consequence of 
each major phase of testing, (e.g., subsystem proof 
testing and spacecraft system tests) and as field 
operations approach. 
Committing reserve talent can be as important 
as committing funds. An organization, with a 
base of supporting research and advanced devel- 
MAJOR-EQUIPMENT PLAN 
1962 
opment and other projects underway, can swing 
talent from one project activity to another when 
crises occur. 
In the JPL over-all organization, divisions had 
many activities other than MM64, and the MM64 
Division Representative held influence over only 
resources committed to MM64 by the Division 
the Division Representatives, the Project insti- 
tuted a series of monthly meetings with the Divi- 
sion Managers-the individuals who controlled 
all the outside talent-to inform them on the 
Project’s progress, to have them report on their 
Division’s contribution to it, and to solicit their 
advice. The long-term aim was an intimately in- 
formed Division Manager, better prepared to bring 
manpower to bear in a pinch. 
The Division Managers came through for 
MM64 when the crises hit, among them these 
notables: (1 ) The early Canopus-tracker photo- 
multiplier tubes could not pass the launch-vibra- 
tion environment; (2)  pellet resistors of the space- 
craft’s Data Automation System deteriorated 
under high-temperature testing; (3 ) the S-band 
power amplifier triode degraded slowly over hun- 
dreds of hours of operation; and the fiber-glass 
shroud ruptured in the Mariner 3 launch. Each 
crisis involved a “first” in the sense that the device 
was being flown for the first time on any mission. 
Each was solved by grouping together special task 
forces of considerable size and ability. 
Schedules. Prior experience had shown that 
projects lose much time in the early phases, where 
significant milestones are more difficult to estab- 
lish than in the hardware phase. 
Since meeting schedules were mandatory for 
M M64, schedule preparation and reporting were 
given careful consideration. Project Management 
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Additional activity occurred at subcontractors. 
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was concerned with three tiers of schedules. 
With launch date fixed, the Project Manager 
prepared a single master control schedule with 
no more than abmt 15 line entries and milestones. 
This schedule entered the PRD, with a clear defi- 
nition of each milestone. 
Conforming to the master schedule, System 
Managers and Division Representatives had to 
prepare the following second tier of schedules in 
milestone format and make written and verbal 
reports on them periodically: 
Spacecraft Development 
GSE Design and Preparation 
Spacecraft Assembly and Operations 
Eastern Test Range (ETR) Operations 
Spacecraft ETR Facilities 
Launch Vehicle 
Launch-Pad Preparation and Utilization 
Launch Vehicle/Spacecraft/ETR Interface Doc- 
unien t a t ion 
Trajectory, Instrumentation, Range Support 
DSIF Modification and Preparation 
Spaceflight Operations Plan 
Major Contracts Schedule 
Once again, these were milestone schedules, put- 
together at the system-management and staff level 
by the Managers estimating what could be 
achieved in a certain time. 
The period when a spacecraft development will 
most likely get out of control comes between sys- 
tem design and delivery of flight-qualified assem- 
\ 
blies for spacecraft assembly and test. To control 
this period, a third tier of schedules was prepared, 
more detailed, but intentionally not so detailed as 
to require handling by a computer. They were 
constrained to conform to the first- and second- 
tier schedules. 
Taking the case of the spacecraft, these sched- 
ules resembled PERT in format and were called 
flow charts. A separate flow chart was assigned for 
preparation and reporting to a particular Division 
Representative for each item on the "Equipment 
List." This list had to be prepared as early as 
possible after system design by the Spacecraft 
System Manager. I t  catalogued the spacecraft as- 
semblies, in the same configuration as they were 
to be carried as spares, tested environmentally, and 
delivered to the Spacecraft Assembly Facility. 
Since an assembly would typically involve modules 
from more than one Division, it was necessary to 
make an assignment to one Division Representa- 
tive for each flow chart, with the other Repre- 
sentatives supplying inputs. 
Standard milestones for all equipment were 
defined in the PRD for use on the flow charts; for 
it appears to be quite easy to misunderstand the 
meaning and intent of schedule milestones if they 
are allowed to become too numerous and to be 
defined by everyone involved as he sees fit. 
The Division Representatives were required to 
submit filled-out forms on their flow-chart progress 
biweekly. The delinquent milestones pertinent to a 
particular Division were sent to the Division Man- 
agers as an "overdue bill." 
Equipment Requirements. MM64 spacecraii 
had to operate properly for at least eight months 
to meet the primary mission objectives. One means 
of achieving such long life was believed to be a 
thorough parts-selection and -screening program. 
The PRD required that, if at all possible, "Hi-rei"- 
rated parts were to be used for spacecraft and that 
every piece-part was to be screened to a specifica- 
tion and tagged. No requirement was imposed for 
serializing and maintaining a log on parts, how- 
ever, in view of the expense and time limitations. 
The parts-screening goal was virtually achieved for 
all equipment. But it was not unusual in screening 
to obtain a yield of only 20% of certain parts. 
The chart on page 38 outlines the major equip- 
ment plan, which had three chief segments: 
1.  Type Approval: A complete set of space- 
craft assemblies were fabricated and subjected 
to a series of environmental tests over ranges ex- 
ceeding those expected in flight to qualify design. 
The t b e  scale caused considerable overlap of 
this type of qualification testing with the flight- 
equipment acceptance testing, making it particu- 
larly difficult to work in needed changes. 
An environmental-requirements group per- 
formed staff support to the Project in preparing 
L 
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general environmental specification. All Divi- 
sions were then required to prepare test specifica- 
tions in conformance with the governing specifica- 
tion for the Type Approval and flight-acceptance 
testing. Deviations were approved by the Space- 
craft System Manager. 
The Type Approval set of assemblies was put 
on a life-test regimen in a thermal-vacuum environ- 
ment to give a comparison with Mariner 4 flight 
experience. 
2. Proof Test Model: A complete spacecraft 
was constructed and subjected to an extensive 
test program as a forerunner of the actual flight 
version. Its assemblies were flight-qualified. Once 
assembled, this spacecraft accumulated approxi- 
mately 1000 hr of testing before the launchings, 
as compared with 6000 hr required in the real 
mission. 
3. Flight Spacecraft. Three sets of equipment 
were flight-qualified at the “assembly flight ac- 
ceptance level” before being introduced into space- 
craft. These tests were the same as Type Approval 
except the levels were reduced to be more con- 
sistent with nominal flight conditions. 
Three spacecraft were prepared to cover the 
loss of at least one by accidental damage, as well 
as a means of completely qualifying a set of spares. 
Each of the three spacecraft had an average of 
800 operating hours at the time of launch and 
had been put through reduced-level tests, which 
had been checked out on the proof-test model. 
Even this heavy testing schedule produced only 
a fraction of the mission in terms of hours of 
operation. 
Problem Failure Reports (PFRs). A strong tool 
in the MM64 Project, PFRs had to be written on 
any anomaly whatsoever associated with space- 
craft, beginning with the testing of the first modules 
for ultimate use in type approval, proof-test model, 
or flight spacecraft. Preparation of PFRs con- 
tinued into the space-flight phase. A PFR had to 
be written as soon as possible after observing an 
anomaly and before attempting to assess the cause. 
In the case of spacecraft-associated PFRs, the 
Spacecraft Project Engineer would then assign the 
analysis of a PFR to the appropriate cognizant 
Division. It in turn was to take some corrective 
action to prevent reoccurrence of the problem. 
The analysis and corrective action were given an 
independent review by Project designees. Not a 
new technique-but the closeout and independent 
review of all PFRs on MM64 was vigorously en- 
forced. The graph on page 39 shows the action. 
The Phased Freeze. Determining when to per- 
mit changes and when to deny them, and by what 
means, is difficult on any project. If an item was 
“frozen” on the MM64 Project, it simply meant 
that changes were discouraged, and might be ap- 
proved after an Engineering Change Request 
(ECR) and review by the Spacecraft System Man- 
agement. Appeals could be made to the Project 
Management should the change not be approved 
by Spacecraft System Management. No instance 
of reversal of the Spacecraft System Manager’s 
decision is recalled, however. 
To effect control, a “freeze” list was issued at 
the conclusion of “system design” on all the func- 
tional specifications in the SDS. This meant there 
would be freedom on the part of the Division cog- 
nizant engineers to change their designs as long as 
functional specifications were not violated. 
Progressively, other controlling documents were 
placed on the freeze list, such as the spacecraft- 
envelope-control drawings and circuit-interface 
drawings. In general, interfaces were resolved and 
controlled as rapidly as possible until December 
1963, at the time of the delivery of the Proof Test 
Model equipment for assembly, when a total freeze 
was imposed. After this date, it was considered 
that any change would have a significant impact 
on the rest of the system, and only changes re- 
garded as mandatory for mission success were 
permitted. Still they were considerable, as the 
second graph on page 39 shows. 
Motivation. The MM64 Project had a natural 
appeal; it would be the first U.S. attempt to reach 
Mars. Yet knowledge of the mission and its chal- 
lenges, such as meeting schedules, had to be 
brought to the attention of everyone possible who 
could, by his actions, influence the success or 
failure of the mission. It was a policy on the Project 
up until launch that, if any speeches were made 
regarding the mission, they were to be made to 
those who could help it succeed. Launch-vehicle 
contractors, spacecraft contractors, DSIF track- 
ing stations, and the Eastern Test Range were 
visited to the extent possible and briefings given 
on the mission. 
The P-List. The P-List (P :  Problem, or Panic, 
as the case might be) was employed on the Mari- 
ner Venus Project in 1962 and was instituted 
anew on MM64 in the spring of 1964. 
This list was the Project Manager’s personal 
bulletin identifying major problems thought to 
jeopardize the mission. By .agreement with the 
Technical Divisions, once an item was identified on 
this list, the most effective people available were 
to go on it. 
To preserve its emphasis, the list was intention- 
ally not issued until the time for spacecraft delivery 
to ETR was only about five months away. The 
list could duplicate in some instances a PFR, but 
it was broader in scope. 
Judiciously used and issued rapidly, the P-List 
can be quite an effective tool. 
Reliability Studks. Reliability analyses were 
made both within JPL and on contract.1-2 Al- 
though coming after MM64 was somewhat defined, 
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and having modest influence on the actual design, 
these .studies exerted a valuable motivating in- 
fluence on the Project personnel, for they con- 
firmed the importance of parts screening, a heavy 
test program, and the design redundancy. 
NASA Quarterly Reviews. NASA instituted 
quarterly reviews of the MM64 Project, and as 
they progressed the Project recognized them to be 
a beneficial experience. On these quarterly occa- 
sions the Project was obligated to organize its 
thinking and expose itself to review, and indeed 
many of the Project personnel took pride in pre- 
senting their progress. Communication between 
the Project and NASA, particularly the NASA 
Program Manager, was quite active during the 
quarter between reviews. Biweekly written reports 
were made to NASA along with telephone confer- 
ences. On-the-spot reviews were performed by the 
Program Manager for tests, shipping, operations. 
Space Flight Operations (SFO). The organiza- 
tion for SFO, shown at top here, was patterned 
after that employed on Ranger and Mariner 2. 
The SPA, SSA, and FPA all recommended ac- 
tion to the SFOD. The SFOD was the “Pilot” and 
took action on all matters such as data modes and 
priority, except for transmitting commands to the 
spacecraft, which the Project Manager had to 
approve. 
The eight-month flight posed particular prob- 
lems such as tedium and a danger that personnel 
might become lax. To offset this tendency, the 
SPA, SSA, FPA, SFOD, and Project Management 
functions were grouped together in a single mis- 
sion area, where progress displays were set up to 
inform interested visitors, who were encouraged to 
make visits there. Regular meetings were held to 
permit total knowledge of progress among each 
of the flight groups on the Project. 
Conclirding Remarks. As a result of the MM64 
experience, we think that some of the management 
practices that are applicable to any project may be 
summarized as follows : 
A clear documenting by management as to what 
it wants done, by whom, and by what time. 
Personal attention and participation by man- 
agement to motivate and keep continually before 
the project participants what the job is that’s to 
be done. 
Management attention to a thread of key events 
during every phase of the project. 
The structuring and use of scheduling, fiscal, 
configuration, and reliability performance con- 
trols with feedback to the various responsible man- 
agers as to the project management’s evaluation 
of their progress. 
Anticipating crisis areas and planning reserve 
resources to cope with crises. 
And finally, a conscientious effort on the part of 
management to emphasize simplicity and accuracy 
in communication exchanges and in the control 
methods. 
’ 
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Mariner 4- 
I .  
A Point of Departure 
By J. R. CASANI, A. G. CONRAD, and R.  A. NEILSON 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
Signaling the culmination of an era in spacecraft development, it 
represents a powerful and refined body of new technology certain 
to affect the designer’s work in the future 
Mariner 4 crowns a spacecraft design philosophy 
codified in 1959 to meet the initial objectives for 
unmanned exploration of the Moon and near plan- 
ets Venus and Mars, its precursors in the develop- 
ment line being the Rangers and the Mariner 2 
spacecraft to Venus. As we write, Mariner 4 con- 
tinues its near-perfect performance on the last lap 
to Mars. I t  should not take much exercise of imagi- 
nation to guess how we feel as we review the de- 
sign of Mariner 4 not knowing the outcome of the 
flyby itself. But as far as concerns the spacecraft 
engineering, we will count it a success, discuss 
what went into it, and consider factors in the 
design and development that may affect future un- 
manned interplanetary vehicles. The reader should 
see our remarks against the broad picture of proj- 
ect management drawn by Jack James on page 34, 
the explanation of structural and mechanical en- 
gineering by J. D. Schmuecker and J. N. Wilson 
on page 26, and other Mariner 4 articles in this 
issue of A / A  and the October issue, which will 
evaluate flight results in terms of design in more 
detai!. Between our writing and your reading, his- 
tory has been made, an era in spacecraft develop- 
ment culminated, and, as history has a somewhat 
arbitrary air, a new era might be said to have 
begun in interplanetary exploration, with Mariner 
4 the point of departure. It represents a powerful 
and refined body of technology certain to affect 
the designer’s work in the future. 
Requirements. The Rangers and Mariners had 
similar basic requirements. Besides surviving the 
launch and space environments, such unmanned 
spacecraft must be able to operate completely un- 
attended for at least about 66 hr in a lunar mis- 
sion and over 6000 hr in a mission to Mars. They 
must, moreover, transmit data gathered by the 
instrument payload back to Earth. These are 
actually the only two basic mission-independent 
requirements for unmanned spacecraft-survive 
while operating unattended and return data to 
receivers on Earth. 
Many approaches might satisfy these require- 
ments. What approach the designer takes depends 
largely on the specific mission-Earth satellite, 
lunar probe, or interplanetary flyby or orbiter. The 
mission objectives will determine the lifetime, com- 
munication distance, and type and quantity of data 
to be transmitted, while various mission restraints, 
such as launch-vehicle capability and launch op- 
portunity, will determine such factors as total 
spacecraft weight and the development schedule. 
Jack James discusses these in some detail in his 
article on page 34. 
The Rangers and Mariners embody a set of 
basic design choices fairly well known by now: 
Full and continuous attitude stabilization, using 
the Sun as one reference and Earth or a prominent 
star as the second; photovoltaic power; and a fixed, 
or pointable, high-gain antenna for most of the 
communications functions. 
At the inccption of JPL’s work on these space- 
craft back in 1959, other possibilities were con- 
sidered, such as spin stabilization, omnidirectional 
antennas, radioisotope thermal-electric power, and 
hibernating and intermittently operating space- 
craft; many others exist. But the core of design 
just cited seemed to oEer the most advantages for 
the existing and projected missions in which JPL 
expected to be involved. The table on page 17 
summarizes the advantages of this core design in 
terms of full attitude stabilization. 
Spacecraft Description. Mariner 4 represents an 
extension of Mariner 2 design and has the same 
flight sequence: Launch by an AtlasjAgena, 
establish a cruise mode, perform early in flight a 
trajectory correction as necessary, gather inter- 
planetary data, and turn on planetary experiments 
and gather data about the planet Mars. Its major 
differences from Mariner 2 reflect the longer flight 
to Mars-eight rather than three months-and 
thermal loads steadily decreasing. 
The spacecraft, fully stabilized in attitude, uses 
the Sun and the star Canopus as references. Cold- 
gas jets point the spacecraft in all three axes, and 
external torques are counteracted in two axes by 
changing the aspect of movable vanes to the Sun. 
Its power system uses photovoltaic cells ar- 
ranged on panels with a body-fixed orientation 
for cruise operations and a rechargeable battery 
for launch, trajectoj-correction maneuvers, and 
backup. Power-conversion equipment delivers reg- 
ulated 2.4-kc square wave, 400 cycle, and unregu- 
lated-DC electricity for distribution to the space- 
craft subsystems. A Central Computer and Se- 
quencer (CCSrS) provides sync signals for fre- 
quency regulation, and performs the sequencing of 
onboard switching. 
The spacecraft has a guidance system permitting 
trajectory-correction maneuvers and a propulsion 
system capable of executing two such corrections; 
these will be covered in an October A / A  article. 
A two-way S-band communications system car- 
ries telemetry to Earth, commands to the space- 
craft, and angle-tracking, doppler and ranging in- 
formation for orbit determination. I t  has two an- 
tennas-a low-gain and a fixed high-gain-either 
FULL ATTITUDE STABILIZATION 
Advantages of design philosophy adopted in 1959. 
Permits high-gain antennas. For communications over great 
distances, this brings a significant reduction in required 
radiated power and consequently a lesser demand for 
raw electrical power--a critical factor in  most spacecraft 
even yet. 
Gives inertial-reference directions automatically, from 
which in-course corrections t o  the f l ight path can be made. 
This is significant f o r  missions requiring greater targeting 
accuracy than the launch vehicle can provide. 
Permits 100% utilization of solar-cell area for photovoltaic 
power conversion systems. Compare this t o  a randomly 
oriented spacecraft, for instance, which for a sphere- 
shaped configuration would be  only 25% efficient. 
For interplanetary missions, the changing heat input from 
the Sun creates difficulties in temperature controlling ran- 
domly oriented or spin-stabilized spacecraft having spin 
axis off the Sun line. Sun-line orientation, on the other 
hand, permits parasol or shading techniques, which make 
it relatively simple t o  isolate the effects of a changing 
solar input. 
Provides a stable platform, with orientation as functions 
o f  time precisely known, for carrying scientific instruments. 
This is particularly advantageous when a requirement exists 
for directing the axis of an optical or scanning instrument 
at a particular place on the target. 
Note: Disadvantages-Position sensors and an associated 
torquing system are required to  maintain orientation. The 
additional complexity of the attitude stabilization and the 
dependence o f  the power and communication system on it 
are considered t o  be  the most serious drawbacks of full 
att i tude stabilization, as compared with spin stabilization 
or random orientation. 
MARINER 4 SUN-LINE ORIENTATION 
of which may transmit or receive. Switching be- 
tween antennas may be done by onboard logic or 
by ground command. The command subsystem 
detects and decodes incoming command messages 
and passes them to the various onboard equipment. 
Two types of commands may be used: Direct 
commands (DCs), which result in direct action 
by the receiving subsystem, and quantitative com- 
mands (QCs) , which are transferred to the CC&S 
to be stored for later use. A Data Encoder subsys- 
tem formats, sequences, and, as necessary, pro- 
vides analog-to-digital ‘conversion of the telemetry 
data. 
The spacecraft carries a number of scientific 
instruments to measure fields and particles between 
Earth and Mars and in the vicinity of Mars-cos- 
mic-ray telescope, cosmic-dust detector, trapped- 
radiation detector, an ionization chamber, a plasma 
probe, and magnetometer. It also carries a tele- 
vision subsystem. A Data Automation Subsystem 
furnishes control and synchronization, performs 
necessary data conversions and encoding functions, 
and buffers the science data, transmitting it to the 
Data Encoder at the various appropriate rates and 
times. 
The performance of this instrumentation will be 
discussed in the October issue of A / A  following 
the encounter. 
Mission Profile. As described by Jack James on 
page 34, the two Mariner launches were scheduled 
to take place at the Air Force Eastern Test Range 
(ETR) during November 1964, using the Atlas/ 
Agena D. The projected flight times were 265 and 
220 days to planetary encounter, plus additional 
time for stored-data transmission. 
During the launch-to-injection phase, data re- 
- 
peption from the spacecraft depends on the avail- 
ability of the required range instrumentation. From 
ates through a parasitic antenna in the shroud. The 
low-gain antenna maintains communications after 
shroud ejection. During this phase, the radio oper- 
ates at decreased power, and the science instru- 
ments are not operating, to prevent a high-voltage 
breakdown as the spacecraft passes through the 
critical-pressure region. Moreover, to avoid vibra- 
tion-induced problems during boost, injection, and 
separation, a holding current is passed through 
selected latching relays, the tape recorder is run- 
ning, and power is not applied to the pyrotechnic 
firing and control circuitry. At separation from the 
Agena D, the cruise-science instruments are turned 
on, the communication-system radiated power is 
increased from 1 to 10 watts, power is applied to 
pyrotechnic firing and control circuitry, the relay 
holding current is removed, and electronic logic 
circuits are set that will turn off the tape recorder 
at the proper time. 
Shortly after separation from the Agena D, 
spacecraft onboard logic commands pyrotechnic 
deployment of the four solar panels and the release 
of a support which holds the scan platform mo- 
tionless during the ascent phase. (See the discus- 
sion by Schmuecker and Wilson on page 26.) 
Attitude-stabilization electronics then begin to op- 
erate and the spacecraft begins to seek its Sun 
reference. 
A battery provides spacecraft power during the 
launch and solar-stabilization phases of the mis- 
sion. Upon its acquisition, the solar panels are 
presented to the Sun, and they begin to supply 
power. It takes about 20 min, after injection, 
for the spacecraft to acquire the Sun. 
After acquisition, the spacecraft's attitude-con- 
trol logic applies a constant roll-error signal that 
produces a controlled roll rate. Designed to furnish 
calibration information for the magnetometer while 
the spacecraft is still in the Earth's magnetosphere, 
this roll continues until 997 min after liftoff, when 
roll stabilization using the star Canopus begins. 
Canopus search involves rolling the spacecraft at 
approximately half the roll rate for magnetometer 
calibration until an object which meets the Cano- 
pus brightness requirements passes into the field 
of view of the Canopus tracker. At this acquisition 
point, the spacecraft gyros are turned off. Should 
the object be something other than Canopus, ac- 
quisition can be overridden by a ground command. 
Now the spacecraft enters the cruise phase, its 
major condition during the transit to Mars, atti- 
tude-stabilized and transmitting continuously. 
Provisions are made for onboard automatic re- 
acquisition should either of the two references be 
lost. The transmitted information consists of com- 
mutated engineering-data frames alternated with 
e liftoff until shroud ejection, the spacecraft radi- 
SYSTEM REDUNDANCY SUMMARY 
Al l  "block" redundancy except 9, IO. I I ,  and 12, which have 
"functional" redundancy. 
Item Description 
I .  RF power amplifiers 
2. RF exciters 
3. Pyrotechnic assemblies 
4. Pyrotechnic arming 
5. Attitude-control gas 
system 
6. Power booster/regulator 
7. Power frequency control 
8. Analog-to-digital 
converter and pseudo- 
noise code generator 
9. Cruise-science control 
relay 
IO. Science cover drop 
1 I .  End o f  TV record 
sequence 
12. Spacecraft cruise and 
encounter events 
13. Midcourse trajectory 
correction 
Two complete power am- 
plifiers plus associated 
power suppiies switchabie 
either by internal logic or 
by ground command. Only 
one operates a t  any time. 
Two identical exciters 
switchable either by inter- 
nal logic or by ground 
command. Only one oper- 
ates a t  any time. 
Two identical half-systems, 
both on line continuously 
after separation. 
Two separation-activated 
switches - pyro-arm switch 
and separation - initiated 
timer. Either will power 
both pyro half-systems. 
Two half-systems and pres- 
sure bottles. Both operate 
continuously after A / C  
turn on. 
Failure-sensing circuit will 
detect over/under voltage 
condition a t  main-booster 
output, and will switch 
maneuver booster on, main 
booster off. 
Primary control-38.4 kc 
sync from CCIS; in  the 
absence o f  this, sync i s  de- 
rived from an oscillator in- 
ternal t o  power. As a terti- 
ary path, the inverters will 
free run a t  approximately 
2.4 kc. 
Two identical units ?witch- 
able by ground command, 
only one operating a t  any 
time. 
Separation or DC-2 control 
the primary cruise-science 
power supply relay. A rec- 
ondary relay i s  driven at 
MT-7 or DC-25 t o  ensure 
cruise science on during 
encounter. 
Solenoid-actuated via pyro 
control assembly for pri- 
mary: backup via lanyard. 
Primary, 2nd "end-of-tape" 
signal; secondary, inhibi- 
t ion o f  start-record com- 
mands after I I non-real- 
time science frames. 
CC&S events for primary: 
backup via ground com- 
mand for all. 
Duplicate pyro - actuated 
valves provide the capa. 
bility for two mid-courses. 
LOW - GAIN ANTENNA 
MAGNETOMETER 
HIGH - GAIN ANTENNA 
SOLAR ABSORPTIVITY 
COSMIC DUST DETECTOR 
THERMAL CONTROL 
LOUVERS 
SOLAR PRESSURE VANE 
frames of experimzntally collected scientific data. 
Within the first few days after injection, the 
cruise phase is interrupted for a trajectory-correc- 
tion maneuver. Usually at least one correction will 
be made to ensure that the spacecraft passes the 
planet at the most advantageous position and time. 
The spacecraft has the capacity for a second tra- 
jectory correction, should it be necessary to im- 
prove aiming-point dispersion. (See “Mariner 4 
flight path to Mars” in the June A / A ,  page 28.) 
Normally, however, this capability would not be 
used before encounter. 
During the interplanetary cruise, several events 
will occur, as a result of trajectory. 
1. The data rate will be reduced from 33% to 
8% bits per second to maintain the telemetry 
margin above threshold. 
2. The Canopus tracker cone angle will be 
electronically updated four times during the mis- 
sion to adjust it to the rotation of the spacecraft 
about the Sun. 
3. The communications-system transmitter will 
be switched from the low-gain to the fixed, high- 
gain antenna as the communication margin dimin- 
ishes with increasing spacecraft-Earth distance. 
The use of a fixed, high-gain antenna for this de- 
sign was possible because of the favorable charac- 
teristics of the Mars ’64 transfer orbit. 
A 13 ‘/3 -hr period bracketing closest approach 
to the planet Mars defines encounter. At the be- 
ginning of this period the TV subsystem and the 
scan-actuator electronics are switched on by on- 
board logic or by ground command. The TV sub- 
system takes pictures during the entire encounter, 
but only pictures taken during the approximately 
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20 min when the planet is in the field of view of 
the camera are of interest. During that time, the 
TV pictures and selected real-time science data are 
stored on a tape recorder having a capacity of 
5.24 X 10” bits. The recorder can store approxi- 
mately 21 TV pictures. From the time that the 
planet comes into the field of view of the wide- 
angle sensor of the scan actuator until the end of 
the TV sequence, the spacecraft telemetry con- 
sists entirely of scientific data, the engineering- 
data frame being supplanted by a special planetary- 
encounter science data frame. 
Mariner 4’s trajectory in the vicinity of Mars 
will cause the planet to occult the spacecraft for 
as much as an hour some time between 1 and 4 hr 
after closest approach. During the last few min- 
utes before occultation, the R F  signals transmitted 
between the spacecraft and the Deep Space Instru- 
mentation Facility (DSIF) will refract through the 
atmosphere of Mars. Kliore et al. describe the 
significance of the occultation experiment in the 
July A / A ,  page 72. 
The stored data will be read out after the en- 
counter phase, alternating at intervals with real- 
time engineering data. Each interval of stored 
data will include one TV picture plus some other 
stored science data, while each interval of engi- 
neering data will contain sufficient information for 
a brief engineering analysis of spacecraft perforni- 
ance and for DSIF operational purposes. These 
transmissions will be repeated cyclically until Earth 
stations have the full record of the experiments. 
With the spacecraft back in the cruise mode, the 
option exists for an experiment to determine the 
feasibility of performing further trajectory correc- 
ALTERNATE AND DEGRADED 
OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES . 
APPROACH OPTIONS 
Cruise Science On 
Functional redundancy (a)  Power switched on a t  separa- 
I?-- with an alternate ,, ,, ”,,_.. current removed 
mode of operation from power-subsystem relay. (b) 
rt encounter. Ground command (DC-2); also 
switches encoder t o  data mode 2. 
(c)  Alternate power-route acti- 
vated a t  turn on of encounter 
science, ground command (DC- 
25), or CC&S (MT-7). (d) Before 
separation, primary mode may be 
exercised by turning off maneuver 
boosters. 
RF Power Up 
Alternate mode. (a )  Removal o f  separation con- 
nector releases holding circuit. 
(b) Turnoff of maneuver booster 
releases holding circuit. 
Tape Recorder Off 
Alternate mode. (a )  Removal of separation con- 
nector activates stop logic. (b)  
Maneuver booster turnoff removes 
tape drive power. 
CC&S Relay Hold Off 
Alternate mode. (a )  Removal o f  separation con- 
nector interrupts holding current. 
(b) Maneuver booster turnoff re- 
moves off holding-current. Relays 
will reset if turned on again. 
Solar-panel Deployment 
Functional redundancy. (a)  Separation-initiated timer. 
Attitude Control On 
Functional redundancy; (a )  Pyro-arming switch. (b) 
turns on Sun sensors CCBS. (c)  Ground (DC- 13) : also 
and switching amplifiers. turns on Canopus tracker and sets 
maneuver-inhibit logic. 
Canopus Tracker On 
Functional redundancy. (a)  CC&S; also turns on solar- 
vane electronics. (b) Ground com- 
mand (DC-13); also turns on at- 
t i tude control and sets maneuver- 
inhibit logic. 
(b) CC&S. 
_____ 
Switch Data Rates 
_______ 
Functional redundancy. (a )  CCLS (MT-6) switches t o  El/, 
bps. (b) Ground command (DC- 
5) switches bit rates (toggle). 
Canopus Cone-Angle Update 
Functional redundancy. (a )  CC&S (MT-I, MT-2, MT-3, 
and MT-4). (b) Ground (DC-17). 
Antenna Switching 
Functional redundancy (a)  CC&S (MT-5) switches t o  
plus alternate mode. transmit via high-gain antenna and 
The initial state of enables CY-I logic. (b) Ground 
system determines reaction command (DC-IO) switcher t o  
t o  any switching input. transmit via high gain and receive 
via low gain. ( c )  Ground (DC-I I ) 
switches t o  transmit and receive 
via high gain. (d) Ground (DC- 
12) switches to  transmit and re- 
ceive via low gain. (e)  Gyros on 
tion maneuvers. The end of the Mariner 4 mission 
will occur 20-40 days after encounter, when the 
combined effects of increased range and antenna- 
pointing error should exceed the communications 
threshold. 
Design Goals and Philosophy. The MM64 a p  
proach involved accepting a modest or conserva- 
tive set ot mission objectives a116 q & k g  t~ these 
the maximum in terms of equipment redundancy 
and alternate operational modes. Several “design 
philosophies” followed from it and enormously in- 
fluenced spacecraft system mechaniziition. 
Probably the most significant of these philoso- 
phies is the notion of the “automatic spacecraft”- 
a spacecraft able to complete its entire mission 
from launch to end of life without ground-based 
intervention or support, except for orbitcorrection 
maneuver. Since the required velocity increment 
can only be determined by ground-based observa- 
tion following the launch, information regarding 
the magnitude, direction, and time for applying 
this velocity increment must be transmitted to the 
spacecraft from the ground. And to satisfy this re- 
quirement, the spacecraft must have the necessary 
sequencing, logic, and control capability to pro- 
gram itself through the various phases of the mis- 
sion profile. 
There are two corollaries to this philosophy of 
the “automatic spacecraft” : First, the constraint 
that the mission profile and flight sequence be 
fixed before launch; and second, that ground com- 
mands not be required for in-line functional sup- 
port, except to provide quantitative information 
to the spacecraft which cannot be determined be- 
fore launch. 
Another of the philosophies requires every dis- 
crete function or event critical to the success of 
the mission to be supported by at least two inde- 
pendent means of initiation. These functions in- 
clude opening the solar panels, initiating attitude 
stabilization, updating the Canopus tracker cone 
angle, and initiating the encounter sequence. 
Usually radio commands plus CC&S commands 
provided the independent initiation; but many 
other techniques were used, as will be discussed 
later. 
A third and very important philosophy requires 
continuous functions critical to mission success to 
be supported by redundant or alternate modes. A 
corollary to this philosophy requires the minimiz- 
ing of subsystem and functional interdependency; 
subsystem failures that would not otherwise be 
critical to mission success must also not cause a 
loss of a second subsystem or critical function. 
What follows amplifies this philosophy. 
Application of Redundancy. The most straight- 
forward method of increasing reliability of a sys- 
tem is to exercise great care in the design, in the 
selection of component parts, and in the manu- 
facturing process. If the system is composed of 
series elements, an increase in reliability of 1 %  
in a single element increases the reliability of the 
total system by a like amount. This type of reliabil- 
ity increase is attained by providing adequate de- 
sign margins, instituting parts qualification and 
selection programs, carrying out extensive inspec- 
tion procedures at both the parts-manufacturing 
and subsystem-assembly levels, and submitting the 
assembled flight items to well-designed prototype 
and flight-qualification testing. The advantage to 
this type of program is that it ensures the highest 
reliability for a given set of weight and perform- 
ance requirements. The limiting factor, however, 
is that the law of diminishing returns sets in, pre- 
cluding any major increase in system reliability 
over that attainable through best engineering and 
manufacturing practice. 
Although this type of reliability, which attempts 
to guarantee that failures will not occur, is cer- 
tainly necessary, it is not sufficient. For example, 
the Mariner 4 spacecraft has 35,000 electrical 
components. Assuming that each has a mean time 
between failures of 100-million hours, the proba- 
bility that at least one component failure will have 
occurred by the end of 6000 hr of operation is 
0.84. The spacecraft design, then, must provide 
for proper operation in spite of failures. This capa- 
bility exists to some extent in any design; com- 
ponents in noncritical applications may fail with 
only slightly deleterious effect, or with no effect at 
all. The failure of others may serve only to re- 
duce protection against nonstandard operating 
conditions. The failure of a critical component, 
however, may not only result in the loss of a sin- 
gle function, but may induce such nonstandard 
operating conditions that other components are 
overstressed and the failures propagate through- 
out the system. 
Under these constraints, redundancy will be the 
only practical way to provide the required system 
reliability. Redundancy may involve the parallel- 
ing of two or more physically identical systems or 
the paralleling of two or more functionally identi- 
cal but physically different systems. Each type of 
redundancy has its advantages. The decision to 
employ one or the other must carefully consider 
the particular application and possible conse- 
quences of the choice. 
Block Redundancy. Paralleling two identical 
units protects against loss of function as the result 
of component or piece-part failure. If the failure 
is casual, however, as would be a design failure 
or an overstress on components due to some ex- 
ternal perturbation of the system, block redun- 
dancy becomes less desirable, since both units 
would be likely to experience the same failure, 
defeating the original purpose of redundancy. This 
problem can be avoided by operating only one 
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switches t o  receive via low gain. 
(f) Two consecutive CY-I  cyclicr 
with receiver out o f  lock switches 
receiver t o  other antenna. Each 
subsequent consecutive CY-I with 
receiver out  o f  lock will switch 
receiver. 
Roll Control 
Alternate modes (a )  Normal; initiated by CC&s 
of operation. and ground command. Canopus 
tracker on with brightness gates 
in  effect. This mode may be  re- 
stored after use of an alternate 
mode by ground command. (b) 
Ground command ( DC- 15) ; Ca- 
nopus tracker on, brightness gates 
removed from circuit. Will track 
any detectable light source. Gyros 
disabled. (c)  Ground (DC-18); 
inertial roll control. Tracker off, 
gyros on. Pitch and yaw gyros i n  
rate mode. Sun sensors unaffected. 
(d) Ground (DC-20) ; no rol l  con- 
trol. Tracker off, gyros off. (e) 
Rate mode; prior t o  Sun gate only. 
Gyros on in  rate mode. (f) Mag-  
netometer calibrate roll mode; 
subsequent t o  Sun acquisition, be- 
fore star acquisition. ( 9 )  Normal 
search; initiated by CC&S or 
ground command (L-3 or DC-13). 
Unti l  initial acquisition only. (h) 
Acquisition override, by ground 
(DC-2I ) ,  causes normal search. 
Data-Mode Switching, Data Mode 1 
Functionally redundant 
for midcourse phase. 
(a)  Ground (DC-27) switches t o  
data mode I, starts midcourse se- 
quence. (b )  Ground (DC- I ) .  
Data-Mode Switching, Data Mode 2 
Functionally redundant. (a )  Reset of CCBS (M-I)  relay 
during midcourse; also initiates 
reacquisition. (b) Ground (DC- 
2); also turns on cruise science. 
( c )  Ground (DC-25); also turns 
on encounter science. (d) Tape 
recorder second end of tape or 
end of DAS NRT frame No. I I ,  
whichever first. (e )  CC&S (MT-7). 
Data-Mode Switching, Data Mode 3 
(a) Wide-angle acquisition. (b) 
Narrow-angle acquisition or TV 
planet-in-view if no WAA.  
- 
Data Mode Switching, Data Mode 4 
Functionally redundant. (a )  CCBS (MT-9); tape playback 
If no data present and data mode 5. ( b )  Ground 
on VSS tape, data i s  command (DC-4); tape playback 
automatically formatted and data mode 4. 
t o  mode I. 
Encounter Science On 
Functionally redundant. 
Encounter Science On 
Functionally redundant. 
Tape-Recorder Tape Track Change 
Functionally redundant. (a )  Internal logic triggered bY 
~ 
__-- 
_ _ _  
(a )  CC&S (MT-7). (bJ Ground 
(DC-25). ~- ~~ ~ _____ 
_ _  _ _  _-- 
( a )  CC&s  (MT-8). (b) (DC-26). 
-~~ -___ 
end-of-tape signal. (b)  DC-22. 
half-system at any given time, and inserting a fail- 
ure-detection and switching unit serially With the 
redundant pair of units. The insertion of this de- 
tection and switching unit, however, decreases sys- 
tem reliability to the extent that it enters as a 
serial element. One other aspect of block redun- 
d m r y  is always unfavorable to some extent; two 
units operating in parallel cost approximately 
twice as much in weight and volume as one unit. 
If they are time-sharing units, controlled by a 
switching element, they cost more power than one 
unit by the amount of power consumed by the 
switching element; and if they operate simultan- 
eously, they draw twice as much power as a single 
unit. 
Functional Redundancy. Paralleling physically 
different but functionally identical subsystems not 
only has the advantage of offering greater protec- 
tion against casual failures than does block re- 
dundancy, but also it can often be done at rela- 
tively low cost in terms of weight, volume, power, 
and complexity. The prime objective in employing 
functional redundancy is to provide at least two 
separate and independent paths by which a critical 
operation can be performed. 
A simple example of this design philosophy in 
the Mariner 4 is found in the deployment scheme 
for the protective cover of the scan and TV optics. 
The primary path for deploying this cover involves 
operating a solenoid to unlatch the cover, and then 
allowing the spring-loaded cover to drop. A sec- 
ondary path has a lanyard connected to the cover, 
so that motion of the scan platform will unlatch 
it. The primary path then depends upon the cor- 
rect operation of the pyrotechnic firing and con- 
trol assemblies and the solenoid, while the second- 
ary path depends on structural integrity and proper 
operation of the scan-platform actuator. The paths 
are separate and independent, with the result that 
no noncatastrophic failure can be postulated which 
will fail both paths, short of a failure in the cover 
itself. 
A second example of functional redundancy 
is found in the philosophy that all critical onboard 
switching functions should be backed up by ground 
commands. I t  would have been possible to include 
a redundant central computer and sequencer in 
the Mariner 4 design, but any advantages would 
have been outweighed by the bulk of the redun- 
dant unit, the complexity of an onboard fajlure- 
detection network, and the operational inflexi- 
bility of such a system. These disadvantages could 
be avoided to some extent by performing the fail- 
ure detection via telemetry and the switching func- 
tion via ground command. This would then require 
that the telecommunications system be inserted in 
series with the CC&S in any consideration of sys- 
tem reliability. A much simpler and more direct 
method of increasing the reliability of onboard 
switching functions is to increase the cppability of 
the already existing command subsystem to pro- 
vide backup command capability. Again a set of 
separate and independent paths are provided for 
critical functions. The value of this approach was 
well proven during the encounter of the planet 
Venus by Mariner 2. 
The block-redundancy approach is not witnout 
merit, however. Certain subsystems lend them- 
selves better to block redundancy than any other 
technique. Subsystems whose design is well under- 
stood and tested, and whose probable-failure 
modes involve component failures unprovoked by 
the design environment itself, are prime candi- 
dates for block redundancy. For that reason, 
Mariner 4 was designed to utilize two completely 
independent nitrogen-gas systems for attitude 
stabilization. Assuming flight equipment is well- 
enough controlled during manufacture, assembly, 
and testing to preclude any severe weaknesses or 
manufacturing flaws, the most probable failure 
mode would be loss of gas pressure due to random 
sticking of the gas valves. In this case, the redun- 
dancy of gas valves between the two half-systems 
permits normal operation if a valve fails closed; 
and if it fails open there are two opposing valves 
to counteract it, one in its own half-system and 
one in the redundant half-system. If the gas load is 
sized properly, after all of the gas in the failed 
half-system has been expended, enough remains in 
the redundant half-system to allow the completion 
of the mission. 
Block redundancy is used in a number of other 
areas in the spacecraft. Two pyrotechnic firing 
and control assemblies are employed in parallel, 
each operating its own pyrotechnic devices or at 
least separate burn wires in the same device. The 
pyrotechnic half-systems are designed to operate 
simultaneously and independently, and each is suf- 
ficient for all pyro functions through the end of 
midcourse maneuver. 
Pyrotechnic-initiated functions include solar- 
panel release, scan-cover release, and motor-igni- 
tion and termination events. These events are typi- 
cal of a class which is time critical as well as 
functionally critical, and the application of block 
redundancy does not necessarily improve the re- 
liability of initiating the required event on time. 
In a number of areas where simultaneous opera- 
tion of redundant units is not permissible, time- 
sharing redundant elements are employed, 
switched on and off line either by onboard failure- 
sensing devices or by ground command. The FW 
power amplifier is continuously monitored in a 
control unit on the spacecraft. Should the power 
output become degraded, the next 66% hr cyclic 
pulse issued by the CC&S will cause the control 
unit to switch the degraded power amplifier and 
its associated power supply off line and switch 
trom an ascent to a cruise configuration. During 
the ascent, two environmental factors-the high 
vibrational loadings and the passage through the 
critical-pressure region-impose severe constraints 
on the spacecraft. Consequently, its structures are 
clamped to prevent damage, no high-voltage cir- 
cuits are operating, no power is applied to the 
pyrotechnics subsystem, magnetic latching relays 
are either electrically held or designed to reset 
at power application, and the video-storage-tape 
drive is running to prevent possible tape spillage. 
All of these must attain a normal cruise state 
between separation and initial star acquisition. 
Most of the events that must take place after in- 
jection are initiated by removal of electrical 
shorts across the Agena separation connector or 
by activating spring-loaded pressure switches at 
the separation interface. The CC&S relay-hold 
function, the tape drive-power, and the “RF 
power up” and “cruise-science on’’ commands 
are all mechanized with shorting plugs across the 
separation connector. In each case, power is sup- 
plied through the separation connector to operate 
circuitry holding gear in the launch state. Upon 
removal of this power, the gear reverts to its nor- 
mal cruise state. Failure of the separation con- 
nector or associated cabling is still a possibility. 
And short circuits can occur internal to the space- 
craft. In such a case it is necessary to find some 
alternate way to return the subsystems to a cruise 
state. 
The key to finding an alternate mode of opera- 
tion for this particular case lies in the fact that an 
interruption of power through the separation con- 
nector is the requirement for normal operation of 
the subsystems involved. The spacecraft has a 
power supply-namely, the maneuver booster- 
normally turned off for all but a few periods dur- 
ing the mission, one being the launch phase. Sup- 
plying power from this maneuver booster to hold 
subsystems in the launch condition establishes a 
secondary means for initiating cruise mode. For 
drive to the tape recorder and “cruise science on,” 
this secondary means gives a true functional re- 
dundancy, since neither is affected by maneuver- 
booster operation after it has been turned off once. 
This is true for the “cruise science on” command 
because it is undirectional; that is, although cruise 
science would be turned on every time the maneu- 
ver booster cycled in the event of a separation- 
connector failure, there is no means of turning 
cruise science off via the same path. For the drive 
to the tape recorder, a judicious design has enabled 
the circuit to remove itself from operation once 
it has functioned. 
In the other two cases-RF power up and the 
relay-hold circuit-this is an alternate operating 
mode in which the spacecraft can perform, but 
somewhat degraded. R F  power will stay high when 
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the maneuver booster is on if the short circuit is to 
spacecraft ground, the only degradation being an 
additional one watt of power drawn from the 
maneuver booster. If the short is across the sepa- 
ration connector, however, R F  power will cycle 
up and down with the maneuver booster on and 
off. As a result, telemetry will be lost each time 
the gyros are turned on in this mode; however, 
the R F  radiated power returns to normal each time 
the gyros are turned off again. As to the CC&S 
relay-hold circuit, all of the relays are reset each 
time the gyros come on, and none can be set until 
the gyros go off again. The primary degradation 
to spacecraft performance from this comes as the 
loss of ability to perform a trajectory correction. 
A number of other examples of the alternate- 
operating-modes approach exist in Mariner 4 de- 
sign, principally at the subsystem level. The table 
on pages 20 and 21 summarizes the alternate 
modes with appropriate remarks. 
Concluding Remarks. At this writing, the flight 
of the Mariner 4 has so far substantiated the merit 
of this design philosophy. All functions have been 
performed normally by the spacecraft, and a 
measure of operational flexibility has been added 
to the flight operations not previously available in 
JPL missions. In addition, one of the alternate 
operational modes has been brought into action 
in response to an environmental effect that could 
have proved catastrophic; the Canopus tracker 
brightness gates were removed by ground com- 
mand (DC-15) after a number of high brightness 
gate violations-possibly the result of the “fire- 
flies” first noted by the Mercury astronauts- 
caused temporary losses of roll stabilization. 
There is every reason to believe that if it proves 
completely valid, the Mariner Mars 1964 design 
approach will be increasingly useful for future 
missions. 
As the mission objectives become more ambi- 
tious, so will the spacecraft which perform them 
become larger and more complex, the susceptibil- 
ity to problems increase, and the penalty for a 
problem which compromises mission success be- 
come more severe. Under these constraints, design 
philosophy must ensure that the spatecraft operate 
normally under the widest spectrum of conditions 
possible and beyond that still be able to operate 
with only slight degradation, even if the implemen- 
tation of such a philosophy reduces payload below 
the maximum possible. After all, even the most 
sophisticated scientific instruments are of no value 
if the basic rules for unmanned spacecraft design 
are violated-that the spacecraft must survive 
while operating and must return the data gathered 
to the Earth. 
R 
on the redundant amplifier and power supply. 
Switching may also be accomplished by ground 
command-an example of the integrated use of 
block and functional redundancy to produce the 
highest possible system reliability. This method 
is also employed with the radio subsystem’s dual 
RF exciters. 
i n e  spacecraft power has redundancy tech- 
niques in two areas at the system level-power 
boosting and regulation, and timing. The Mariner 
4 design includes two separate power booster/ 
regulators, one primarily for fixed loads and the 
other for varying and intermittent loads. This per- 
mits the fixed-load, or main, booster to be sized 
for peak efficiency during the power-critical period 
at encounter. Efficiency is not a prime considera- 
tion for the intermittent, or maneuver, booster, 
since its duty cycle is extremely low and normally 
it is not operating for extended periods near en- 
counter. Therefore it was sized so that it could 
assume all of the spacecraft loads in the event of 
a main-booster failure. A failure-detection circuit 
which senses an overvoltage and undervoltage 
operates the switching network that removes the 
main booster and inserts the maneuver booster. 
A redundant timing system is also provided for 
frequency synchronization of 2400- and 400-cycle 
power. Primary timing is derived from the central 
computer and sequencer; should this path fail, 
there is a backup oscillator in the power subsys- 
tem capable of assuming the timing function. 
A second backup is provided through the de- 
sign of the inverters, which have a natural fre- 
quency nominally equal to the synchronization 
frequency, so that near-normal operation can be 
maintained in the absence of any external timing 
signals. 
Finally, two units are provided in the telemetry 
encoder for the conversion of analog data to a 
digital format and for the generation of the 
pseudo-noise code. Switching between units is 
done by ground command. 
In Mariner 4, subsystems critical for all or 
most of the mission objectives are the ones to 
which system-redundancy techniques have been 
applied, as summarized in the table on page 18. 
The items listed are those for which two or more 
redundant units of hardware have been included in 
the design, using either the block or functional 
approach. In each case, either of the redundant 
items can be used. Not included in this table are 
the functions or techniques employing alternate 
or degraded modes of operation, which will be 
covered next. 
Alternate and Degraded Operational Modes. 
Somewhat apart from the general spacecraft relia- 
bility considerations are a number of problems 
involving degraded operation for reasons of fail- 
ures or abnormal environments, operational flexi- 
m. 
PLANET SCAN SENSOR CANOPUS SENSOR 
PLANETARY-SCAN INSTRUMENTS AND SENSORS 
bility, and design and operational procedures for 
time-critical functions. With Mariner 4, the ap- 
proach to these has been to create or to exploit 
some alternate mode of spacecraft operation. 
Generally, for each function considered one or 
more alternates have been available, with a mini- 
mum of design perturbation. 
It is obvious that alternate modes of operation 
underwrite continuous operation against failures 
or abnormal environments. Furthermore, if the 
modes can be selected by ground command, the 
system gains operational flexibility. 
The alternate-mode approach can also prove 
especially valuable in treating time-critical func- 
tions. Suppose, for instance, an event is con- 
strained to occur within an interval of time, and 
it occurring outside this interval will be potentially 
catastrophic. Using redundancy techniques alone, 
any action taken to increase the probability that 
the event has occurred by the end of the interval 
will also increase the probability that it occurs be- 
fore its beginning. Conversely, an attempt to pre- 
clude any occurrence before the interval will lower 
the probability that the event has occurred by the 
end of the interval. 
The dilemma which this presents is nicely cir- 
cumvented by the alternate-mode approach. The 
system is mechanized to lower the probability of 
premature occurrence to an acceptable level, and 
the attendant risk of late occurrence is accepted. 
To offset the effects of late occurrence, an alter- 
nate mode is provided that permits all of the 
mandatory functions associated with the event 
to be performed at the expense of some possible 
system degradation. Since this approach generally 
involves multiple interfaces among subsystems, the 
large number of possible combinations of sub- 
system states provides a relatively wide spectrum 
of operational modes, some number of which can 
be selected by ground command. 
The phases of the mission which lend them- 
selves best to an alternate-mode design approach 
are the spacecraft/Agena separation and initial 
acquisition phases, which cover the period in 
which the spacecraft must make the transition 
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of Mariner Mars 
By JAY D. SCHMUECKER and JAMES N. WILSON 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
Many important design lessons have been learned, and relearned, 
with this spacecraft, which may well prove a model for future in- 
terplanetary vehicles 
Since Mars launch opportunities occur only at 25- 
month intervals, the Mariner 4 spacecraft had to 
be designed, fabricated, and tested on a tight 
schedule, with no slippage possible, to meet a 
launch in the designated time period, as discussed 
by Jack James on page 34. This firm but short 
schedule, severe weight restrictions, and very high 
reliability levels dictated seemingly incompatible 
requirements of making the spacecraft light in 
weight, yet using proven techniques. 
This article describes how the problem was re- 
solved. I t  includes description of the various sub- 
systems, along with reasons why designs or ap- 
proaches were selected. Philosophy will be 
discussed, problems uncovered and solved during 
the development cycle reviewed, and recommenda- 
tions for future projects made. Primary emphasis 
will be placed on new developments and less on 
those more routine. 
Configuration. Developing the mechanical con- 
figuration of a spacecraft-a fascinating process- 
involves unifying all its discrete elements, most of 
which confront the designer with conflicting re- 
quirements. A good configuration minimizes prob- 
lems as development proceeds. For example, solar 
panels in the wrong place may necessitate extra 
structural support and increase panel dynamic 
environment. And allowing many spacecraft ele- 
ments to protrude beyond a relatively smooth ex- 
terior may unduly complicate temperature-control 
analysis and testing, from several points of view. 
Some of the requirements to be satisfied by a 
configuration include the following: The envelope 
dictated by the launch-vehicle shroud cannot be 
violated; adequate and usable volume for all 
equipment must be provided; and view-angle con- 
straints imposed by solar cells, antennas, attitude- 
control sensors, and scientific instruments must be 
met. Temperature-control design constraints must 
also be satisfied, and operational requirements 
considered. 
Nearly 20 different approaches were investi- 
gated during the Mariner 4 configuration devel- 
opment, leading to the flight configuration shown 
on page 19. Built around an octagonal structure, 
18 in. high and 4% ft in diam, the spacecraft has 
electronic equipment housed around its periphery 
in seven of eight bays. The eighth bay houses the 
post-injection propulsion system. 
Location of the propulsion system, approxi- 
mately normal to the roll axis, represents a de- 
parture from previous practice. During the early 
phases of the configuration design, the capability 
for doing a “restricted” trajectory-correction ma- 
neuver was desired. The maneuver could thus be 
mechanized using only a roll turn, never losing 
the Sun attitude reference and solar power. As the 
design evolved, this requirement disappeared; but 
during the interim configuration iterations, many 
other desirable features of so locating the mid- 
course motor more than offset the disadvantages. 
Placing the motor in this position allowed it to be 
easily installed at the last moment as a fully fueled 
unit, and space was available in the traditional 
motor location for the planet-oriented scientific 
instruments. The maneuver attitude-control sys- 
tem was compromised slightly by this position. 
On top of the basic octagon structure ride the 
four deployable solar panels, restrained during 
boost by eight concentrics tube viscous dampers. 
Power requirements called for 70 sq ft of panel 
area, made rectangular and of modular dimensions 
to allow dense solar-cell layout. The low-gain an- 
tenna sits on top of the octagon, and the fixed, 
high-gain parabolic antenna on top of the super- 
structure. During the initial portion of the flight, 
the low-gain antenna illuminated the forward 
hemisphere in which the Earth was always lo- 
cated, even during the trajectory-correction ma- 
neuver. This indicates another advantage of hav- 
ing the motor normal to the roll axis; had it been 
parallel to the spacecraft-Sun line, another an- 
tenna would have been needed for communication 
during the then different maneuver. 
On the tips of the solar panels are mounted the 
. 
cold-gas attitude-control jets. Despite the design 
and operational complexity of having the attitude- 
control plumbing cross the solar-panel hinge line, 
placing the jets at the tips of the panels increased 
their moment arm enough to allow significant re- 
ductions in the total gas weight. Dual gas supplies 
are situated within the octagon. Also at the tips 
of the solar panels are movable solar-pressure 
vanes for attitude stabilization. These vanes cause 
the spacecraft to be stable under solar pressure 
and by their movement allow balancing of up- 
setting moments. The vanes stow in a furled posi- 
tion behind the solar panels during boost. 
Attitude-control Sun, star, and Earth sensors 
ride the basic octagon structure, so placed to give 
minimum interference in viewing fields. To min- 
imize light reflections into it, the sensitive Canopus 
star tracker rides in the shade of the aft side of 
the spacecraft, with its field of view extending be- 
tween two solar panels. The cruise scientific in- 
struments are mounted around the periphery of 
the octagon, on the superstructure, and those re- 
quiring physical isolation from the spacecraft are 
mounted on the low-gain antenna. Originally 
mounted on the tips of the solar panels these latter 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
! 
I .  
r 
instruments were later relocated with some small 
compromise in data quality. 
TV camera and planetary sensors ride on a one 
degree-of-freedom rotating structure, mounted on 
the center line of the spacecraft with the instru- 
ments facing 120 deg away from the Sun line. An 
actuator in the basic structure can rotate the struc- 
ture 180 deg about an axis parallel to the Sun line. 
Most of the temperature-critical spacecraft 
components ride in the primary octagon. Various 
surface finishes and six sets of thermostatically 
controlled louvers mounted on the sides of the 
octagon control spacecraft temperature. Multi- 
layer aluminized-mylar shields on the sunward 
side of the spacecraft isolate it from the changing 
solar intensities and on the aft side, shown on page 
27, minimize heat losses to space. Polished alumi- 
num shields control the heat losses from the un- 
louvered sides of the spacecraft. Combinations of 
surface finishes control the temperature of ele- 
ments outside of the basic octagon. 
. 
Basic spacecraft  structure consists of two 41/2-ft-diam 
machined magnesium rings coupled by eight longerons. The 
outboard surface of the electronic-packaging chassis provides 
shear webs around the periphery. 
Many of the requirements imposed on the con- 
figuration design by subsystems are reasonable, 
but a few turn out to conflict severely. The con- 
figuration designer has to review these require- 
ments constantly to verify that they are manda- 
tory. Many initially firm requirements can be 
compromised without undue degradation of the 
subsystem, thus allowing a more nearly optimum 
system design. An example of this was the re- 
quirement that the solar-plasma experiment have 
a 15-deg unobstructed view of the Sun. There 
was no place on the spacecraft which satisfied 
this requirement, thus creating the need for some 
kind of deployable structure. Consultation with 
the scientist and engineer responsible for the in- 
strument indicated that it could be allowed to 
point a small angle away from the direct Sun line 
without significant compromise to the data. This 
allowed location on the octagon and simplified 
the total design. The propulsion-system location 
previously mentioned violated an originally firm 
requirement to point along the roll axis. Many 
other such compromises during the configuration 
design simplified the end result. 
The table on page 29 lists Mariner 4 weights, 
with a detailed breakdown of the mechanical sub- 
system portion. 
Primary Structure. Tie basic vciagoiial Siiuc- 
ture consists of two 495-ft-diam machined ZK-60 
T5 magnesium rings coupled together by eight 
longerons. The outboard surface of the electronic 
packaging chassis provides shear webs around the 
periphery. This basic approach had been tried 
successfully on a smaller scale on the early Mari- 
ner/Centaur spacecraft. Miscellaneous supporting 
structure within this octagon mounts the low-gain 
antenna, the planet-oriented equipment support 
structure, and the gas-pressure vessels for the 
attitude-control system. All attitude-control sen- 
sors ride either the upper or lower rings on inte- 
grally machined pads. Thus, no machining or ad- 
justments after assembly was required. Extensive 
use of tooling to manufacture the rings and long- 
erons allowed the basic structure to be assembled 
rapidly with a minimum of jigs. The spacecraft 
was attached to the Agena-D adapter by a V- 
band, which held eight shoes clamping eight feet 
on the lower ring of the spacecraft. The super- 
structure that supports the high-gain antenna and 
dampers for. the solar panel and low-gain antenna 
consists of a welded aluminum truss bolted to the 
top of the octagon. The accompanying photo 
chows the primary structure and superstructure 
installed on a handling ring. 
Solar-Panel Structures. Each of the four solar- 
panel structures consist of a 0.005-in.-thick alumi- 
num substrate made rigid by corrugated stiffeners 
of 0.0035-in.-thick aluminum. This structure is 
supported by a pair of longitudinal box beam 
spars, their bases being attached to the primary 
structure by rod end-bearings. These elements 
were bonded together, as initial tests demonstrated 
that the more conventionai spot-welded construc- 
tion was inadequate to survive the acoustic en- 
vironment of boost. Each panel was restrained 
during boost by two concentrics tube viscous 
dampers attached from the superstructure to the 
panel spars at their quarter points. The dampers 
contained a 5-mii annuius iiiied witii si:icoiie 
grease. A spring was included to statically center 
the damper tubes. The top photo on page 30 shows 
a prototype panel supported by the damped struts; 
and the photo below it shows the panel backside. 
As a direct result of the vibration reduction 
brought by these dampers, the solar-panel struc- 
1 MARINER 4 WEIGHT PROFILE 
Structure and Mechanisms I 
Primary octagonal structure ................................... 30.86 
Superstructure ............................................................ 3.06 
Propulsion-support structure and cover .................. 3.89 
Six electronic-assembly chassis ................................ 25.45 
High-gain antenna .................................................... 4.44 
Low-gain antenna ...................................................... 3.87 
3.09 
Dampers .................................................................... 2.09 
Four solar-panel structures ........................................ 44.72 
Four sets of panel deployment and 
retardation hardware ............................................ 2.16 
Four sets of solar-pressure-vane structure and 
deployment hardware .................................. 2.52 
Science-platform structure and associated gear .... 4.12 
Science-platform actuator ........................................ 2.07 
Science cover and deployment hardware ............. 1.14 
Solar-panel and low-gain-antenna support .............. 
131.39 
Cable harnesses and connectors ............................. 44.72 
Harness-support structures ....................................... 3.80 
48.52 
Electronic Cabling 
Temperature-Control Hardware 
8.16 
Temperature-control shields and 
associated gear ...................................................... 7.02 
Absorptivity standard ................................................ I .37 
0.45 
17.00 
Science Instruments and Electronics 
Platform instruments and sensors ......................... 10.97 
Low-gain-antenna and primary structure 
mounted experiments ...................................... 12.37 
Science electronics and data conditioning gear ..__ 34.42 
57.76 
Six sets of temperature-control louvers ................. 
Canopus sensor light shields ................................... 
Power Conversion and Storage Equipment 
Conversion and regulation electronics .................... 39.32 
Battery ........................................................................ 33.46 
Panel solar cells and wiring ...................................... 34.40 
107.18 
Electronics .................................................................. 18.80 
Motor thrust-vector-control assembly ................ 3.28 
Attitude-control sensors ......................................... 6.38 
Two attitude-control gas systems ......................... 22.92 
Total nitrogen gas ................................................ 5.00 
Four solar-pressure-vane control assemblies .......... 2.80 
59.18 
I 1.89 
Data encoder ................................................... 22.45 
Tape machine .......................................................... 17.04 
39.49 
Command ........................................................... 10. I I 
R F  transmitter and receiver .............................. 35.50 
Attitude Control and Guidance Equipment 
Central Timer and Sequencer ......................... 
Data Handling and Storage Electronics 
RF Communications Electronics 
45.6 I 
Propulsion hardware .................................. 23.39 
Propellant .................................................. 2 I .50 
Nitrogen gas ...................................................... 0.92 
Propulsion System 
45.8 I 
Electronics and switches .................................. 8.51 
Pinpullers and squibs ............................................... 2.1 7 
10.68 
Miscellaneous Hardware ........................... 0.86 
Total pounds: ................................................... 575.37 
Pyrotechnic Subsystem 
1 
rural weight-to-area ratio was only 0.58 lb/sq ft. 
After two pyrotechnic pin pullers holding each 
panel to the dampers fired, each panel deploys 90 
deg by means of two clock springs attached at the 
hinge. Then a hydraulic damper absorbs the en- 
ergy imparted to the panels and positions them. 
The dampers also minimize solar-panel excursions 
during propulsion maneuvers. 
Antenna Structures. The high-gain antenna re- 
flector was fabricated from aluminum honeycomb 
- c e l l  material 0.0007 and skins 0.004 in. thick. 
The core was formed into a parabolic shape by 
first bending it along several lines parallel to the 
long direction of the antenna, thus forming it into 
a roughly cylindrical shape; then, by draping the 
core over a parabolic mold, it deflected about the 
short axis, allowing the original cylindrical radius 
to increase to the proper curvature. The skins were 
bonded to .this formed core by applying a l-mil 
sheet of adhesive to the facings. The edges of the 
core were filled with a foam plastic to minimize 
handling damage. The antenna feed truss was 
fabricated of unidirectional RF-transparent fiber- 
glass tubes, and used RF-transparent Lexan plas- 
tic truss fittings. 
The low-gain antenna is a circular waveguide 
structure, 4 in. in diameter, with the feed located 
at the aft end and an aperture at the forward end 
to shape the beam. This approach proved con- 
siderably lighter than a conventional antenna lo- 
cated on a support structure with a long coax cable 
to the antenna. Like the solar panels, this long 
mast was damped by concentrics tube viscous 
dampers. Wall thickness-0.025 in.-of the antenna 
was determined by the ability of the waveguide to 
withstand handling abuses and not from structural 
requirements. 
Planet-Science Pidform Structure and Mechan- 
isms. The planet-oriented scientific instruments 
and sensors ride on a structure cantilevered aft 
from the primary one. An actuator atop a central 
torque tube rotates the platform to achieve the 
scan. The platform was restrained during boost by 
a pyrotechnic pinpuller. Cables to the instruments 
run through the 15411. long central tube, loosely 
bundled, allowing them to twist during articula- 
tion. The actuator, a slightly modified version of 
the one used on Mariner 2, consisted of a 400- 
cycle, 26-volt, 8000-rpm synchronous motor and 
reduction gearing to give a 0.5 deg/sec output. 
Cam-operated limit switches reverse the scanning 
motor. The actuator has a housing pressurized with 
dry air to 2 atm (absolute). An aluminum honey- 
comb cover protects the delicate planet-oriented 
instruments from cosmic dust and sunlight. It can 
be deployed by a solenoid or independently by a 
lanyard triggered by platform rotation. 
Electronic Puckaging. Packaging design em- 
ployed modifications of the proven techniques 
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used in previous programs. The electronic com- 
ponents were packaged in standard-profile sub- 
assemblies. Typically, two vertical rows of sub- 
assemblies were mounted into each electronic 
chassis, and this bolted to the primary structure. 
This structurally efficient, compact design was 
very flexible; it allowed the spacecraft design to 
proceed while electronic-subsystem sizes and loca- 
tions were still being determined. 
Placing all the components relating to one elec- 
tronic subsystem into one easily removable chassis 
facilitated subsystem lab and environmental test- 
ing. During spacecraft-system testing, subassembly 
accessibility was achieved by either removing the 
complete electronic assembly or removing the sub- 
assembly from within the primary structure. The 
photo on page 32 shows an electronic chassis, 
typical electronic packaging approaches, and a 
case harness. 
Several component packaging techniques were 
used : 
1. Planar Packaging. Components of various 
sizes were mounted to printed wiring boards which 
in turn were mounted to the magnesium sub- 
chassis. This approach gave design flexibility and 
eased component replacement. 
2. Cordwood Packaging. Repetitive circuits 
were packaged in potted modules, which were 
then mounted to the subchassis. This approach 
gave high packaging density but compromised 
component replacement. 
3. Pelletized-Component Packaging. A new 
technique, inserting pelletized components into a 
printed circuit board, saved much weight and 
space. This approach was used on some low-power 
subsystems. 
4. Other Techniques. Combinations of these 
approaches and special techniques were used 
when needed. 
Electronic Cabling. Cabling interconnects all the 
spacecraft subsystems. Case harnesses intercon- 
nect subassemblies, and through pigtails connect 
to a ring harness trough-mounted on top of the 
basic structure. This trough contains power and 
signal-wire bundles. Another harness, around the 
periphery of thc spacecraft base, carries urr?bilicz! 
and attitude-control functions. 
The wiring conductors consist of AWG 22 and 
24 multistrand wire; insulation, of three wrapped 
layers of 0.003-in. polytetrafluoroethylene. 
Two types of connectors were used: Bendix 
cycles; and subminiature rack and panel Cannon 
D-series-type connectors in confined areas, nota- 
bly on the electronic subchassis. 
The cabling design had to allow for wiring 
changes, as many incompatibilities are not dis- 
covered until spacecraft electrical testing begins. 
In most cases, it was easier to change intercon- 
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Prototype solar panel supported by damped struts: below, 
other side of panel, showing structure. 
necting cabling than the subassembly wiring. 
Developmental Testing. Besides the many qual- 
ification tests on systems and subsystems, there 
were a mmDer of deve!opment tests-feasibility. 
functional, and design-verification. These proved 
very rewarding, as they uncovered a significant 
number of possible problems in time to solve 
them. The qualification tests went quite routinely, 
very few failures being observed. 
Near!y 40 different kind4 of mechanical tests 
were made during the Mariner development cycle; 
these included a damped structure feasibility test, 
matchmate tests with the booster hardware, a test 
in which the softly suspended spacecraft was sub- 
jected to the propulsion maneuver controlled by 
the attitude-stabilization system, solar-panel-de- 
ployment tests, effects of shroud impacts on the 
backs of the panels, and deployment of the solar- 
pressure vanes. Also made were temperature- 
control-model and subsystem tests in a space 
simulator; tests of thermal-shield outgassing and 
of ballooning as multilayer shielding experienced 
decreasing pressure; a test of sunlight reflections 
into or near the Canopus tracker; aerodynamic- 
fairing purging, cooling and combined-vibration 
tests; and separation tests of the spacecraft from 
the Agena adapter. 
Selected Problems and Solutions. Many prob- 
lems came to light during the Mariner 4 devel- 
opment, but none of the expected ones. Since 
significant knowledge or learning resulted from 
the solutions of these problems, and since they 
contributed much to the project’s success, they 
will be treated here in some detail. 
One problem, partially expected, had to do 
with the spacecraft’s very lightweight, fragile 
structures. Handling problems had been antici- 
pated with the solar panels and antennas, but not 
of the magnitude encountered. These structures, 
which could be damaged by pencils falling out of 
technicians’ pockets, a slip of a knuckle as a screw 
was tightened, etc.-prompted several corrective 
steps. Technicians were trained to avoid all com- 
mon accident pitfalls. A movie depicting many of 
these was prepared for showing to both technicians 
and contractors who would handle the structures. 
And special procedures were evolved to repair the 
inevitable damage. Another problem had to do 
with temperature control; portions of fragile struc- 
tures had to be made heavier to give adequate heat 
conduction. 
A problem not expected at all concerned stray 
light being reflected into the Canopus tracker. 
Although the Canopus tracker was placed in a 
position to minimize this, analysis and design 
techniques did not adequately predict reflections 
from various surfaces, the effects of diffuse illumi- 
nation, etc. The geometry involved was just too 
complex. 
For this reason, a full-size, representative space- 
craft was placed in a darkroom where portions of 
it could be illuminated by simulated sunlight, and 
the intensity of reflected light from various por- 
tions of the spacecraft was measured at the 
Canopus tracker. Fixes were made and evaluated 
during the test. The following corrective actions 
were taken: Tooling holes in the solar panels 
were plugged to minimize light shining through 
and illuminating their backsides. Many shades 
were added around the spacecraft to block light 
reflections. The edges of the solar panels and the 
solar pressure vanes were specially treated to 
minimize reflections, and the paint on the solar- 
panel backsides was changed from a dull (diffuse 
reflection) to a glossy finish. 
New concepts were fostered and developments 
undertaken to minimize solar-panel actuator 
weight. The Ranger and Mariner 2 philosophy of 
deploying the panels at a slow, controlled rate was 
continued, but lighter actuators were proposed and 
attempts were made to remove the potential haz- 
ard to the spacecraft of fluids leaking. Two actu- 
a tors-one patterned after a telephone dial and 
another patterned after a rotary-vane motor- 
were devised; they worked, but presented potential 
reliability problems. 
A critical review of reliability and failure modes 
fostered a different approach late in the program. 
By this time, a better understanding of all space- 
craft requirements permitted nearly unretarded 
deployment of the panels, with a gentle decelera- 
tion to the deployed position. Analysis and tests 
verified that the unretarded deployment had ade- 
quate margins on both the overcoming of fric- 
tional torques and on the panel-stopping loads. 
Negotiation with the attitude-control engineer 
verified that the cruise damper characteristics 
could be modified to allow them to perform the 
stopping of the panels. From this point on, the 
development progressed with relative freedom 
from difficulty. 
Towards the end of preliminary design, pro- 
gram considerations forced a change of scientific 
instruments. The new instruments selected were 
different enough to force substantial changes to 
both the configuration and the detailed design of 
the spacecraft structure. This design iteration de- 
layed the completion of preliminary design and 
had far-reaching effects felt late in the program. 
Schedule changes shortened development and test- 
ing time to the point that i t  was hard to feed results 
of tests back into the design. In evaluating the 
design changes, moreover, not all of the original 
considerations were reviewed, and this caused 
trouble, not major, but enough to complicate the 
development process. 
The problem of spacecraft contamination had 
been of concern right along, but was not really felt 
until late in the program. Although we had se- 
lected polymeric materials thought compatible 
with the space environment, tests showed many 
to outgas products potentially deleterious to tem- 
perature-control or optical surfaces. This led to a 
policy of pre-outgassing everything possible, e.g., 
sewn aluminized-mylar thermal shields, dacron 
material used as the exterior surface of thermal 
shields, nylon cable clamps, and many other 
smaller components. The result of this work was 
an absence of contaniination during qualification 
testing of the flight spacecraft. 
Another contamination problem of concern in- 
volved the possibility of dust, dirt, paint flakes, 
and other particles falling into the view of the 
Canopus tracker. If illuminated by sunlight, i t  
was reasoned, such particles might be sufficiently 
~ 
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bright to confuse the tracker and cause it to lose 
lock on the referenced star. Investigations indi- 
cated that it was not possible to insure that the 
spacecraft had no dust particles on it. But much 
was done to lessen the chance of particles from 
various places. Techniques were evolved to clean 
and reclean the spacecraft surfaces to the maxi- 
mum extent possible, to use capped female fasten- 
ers wherever possible to minimize the possibility 
of burrs or thread chips being free to float around 
the spacecraft, to assemble the spacecraft in a 
clean facility, and to clean the aerodynamic fair- 
ing acoustically to remove as much debris as pos- 
sible. Despite this regimen, flight data indicates 
that significant numbers of particles floated by the 
Canopus tracker, causing its brightness gates to be 
exceeded and tracking lost. This brightness gate 
was removed by radio command with no subse- 
quent deleterious effects. 
Dot or pellet components were used in portions 
of the spacecraft to minimize weight and volume. 
Although these had not been used on a spacecraft 
before, developing them for flight was felt to be 
understood well enough to commit them to the 
vehicle. The develupment progressed very well; 
but late in the program, a chemical incompatibility 
in these units when subjected to elevated tempera- 
tures for long periods lowered confidence in their 
suitability. Although all of these components 
could not be removed from the spacecraft, and the 
test conditions under which the problem arose 
were more severe than those expected in fight, a 
hurried backup design was pursued for a portion 
of the system. This backup used welded modules 
with special interconnections. It raised weight 
15% and volume 35%. The modular subchassis 
approach used as part of the packaging scheme 
allowed a slight rearrangement of subassemblies 
to take this change this late in the program, when 
it was felt to be needed. 
Conclusions and Recommendations. By care- 
fully considering operational problems and apply- 
ing special handling, integrated structure and 
packaging designs are, in fact, workable. The need 
for simple and adaptable designs was proven to 
be necessary in several cases. For instance, the 
program required last-minute packaging, cabling, 
and instrument changes, and it was possibiie to 
make these and affect only portions of the space- 
craft design. Last-minute thermal shield and lou- 
ver changes based on late information derived 
from tests were also accommodated with relative 
ease because provision for so doing had been 
incorporated into the design. 
The use of dampers to minimize vibration, and 
so permit lightweight structures, progressed with 
a minimum of problems. This was a significant 
new development, proven by feasibility tests be- 
fore it was committed to flight. A requirement to 
contain as many elements of thz spacecraft within 
a thermally controlled envelope caused few prob- 
lems and was easily accommodated. 
Building-in mechanical alignments, rather than 
providing adjustments, proved adequate. The fact 
that flight performance and trajectory corrections 
have been well within tolerance verifies this ap- 
proach. 
In retrospect, it appears that there were signifi- 
cant numbers of items involving new developments 
which were of enough concern that they received 
special and prolonged attention. Most of these 
were relatively trouble-free. However, items not 
thought to be major problems did not receive the 
same degree of attention and they ultimately did 
turn out to be problems. Moral: Detailed and 
comprehensive attention needs to be paid to all 
elements of the system, no matter how minor. 
Having completed the Mariner 4 design, devel- 
opment, and qualification tests and the majority 
of the flight, there are a very few things that we 
would like to do differently. As mentioned earlier, 
we relearned some old ideas and philosophies- 
most particularly, to not attempt to develop new 
items on a project schedule. Only tried and proven 
techniques should be used. The solar-panel actu- 
ators are e prime example wherein a new develop- 
ment, although reasonably successful, was fraught 
with problems requiring several changes ultimately 
consuming a great deal of effort. This particular 
approach seemed easy and understandable, but the 
fact that it had not been proven before commit- 
ment to the spacecraft indicated that there were 
potential problems for investigation. The use of 
the dot or pellet component packaging techniques 
fits this category, and gave similar results. 
It is wise, shall we say, not to leave considera- 
tion of any element of the system until the last 
minute. One is continually tempted to stagger 
developments to best apply effort to more critical 
problems, However, the interactions among all 
elements of such a complex design is too great to 
ignore even the smallest element. The thermal 
shields on Mariner 4 exemplify this. I t  was felt 
they could be added later, almost as an after- 
thought, without undue complications. When their 
development was started, many unforeseen prob- 
lems and interactions were discovered. They had 
to be redone many times in a hurry before a suc- 
cessful design was achieved. Furthermore, their 
design was compromised in some areas because 
the rest of the spacecraft was defined too com- 
pletely to be changed. We would recommend that 
at least one cycle of the design of every element 
should be done at an early date. After this, if 
further design of certain elements needs to be de- 
layed, at least some awareness of the interactions 
and problems will have been developed early. 
Another recommendation would be to not make 
structures as light and fragile as Mariner 4 ' s .  Hav- 
ing successfully completed the development of 
these lightweight structures, it is our feeling that 
we have explored an extreme case where structural 
considerations in fact became secondary. Having 
strived for years to achieve lighter and lighter 
structures, we finally overdid it. A very few pounds 
of weight applied to these structures would have 
been well spent in terms of reducing the very care- 
ful handling procedures necessary and the many 
repairs required. 
Materials selection and packaging techniques 
should be controlled much more strongly. For this, 
a central responsibility is needed to insure that the 
many hardware designs and associated techniques 
use acceptable procedures. These techniques and 
procedures, which take years to understand and 
assimilate, are not within the capabilities of the 
scattered organizations nominally selecting both 
materials and packaging techniques. 
The importance of developmental testing can- 
not be overemphasized. Through such exploratory 
testing comes an understanding of hardware be- 
havior which cannot be achieved by analysis 
alone. If this increased understanding is coupled 
with a tenacious refusal to leave unexplained any 
phenomena, event, or feeling, then few surprises 
during qualification testing and flight should be 
found. The recommendation is to pursue develop- 
mental testing of all spacecraft elements, leaving 
no stone unturned, and redesigning and retesting 
until nothing is unexplained. This approach will 
consume a lot of effort, and the significant monies 
required for its undertaking are difficult to justify 
to cost-conscious project managers. But consider- 
ing the substantial investment of a space program 
and the consequences of a failure, the cost of such 
tests are reasonable. Example: The elimination of 
the Mariner stray-light reflectance test (which was 
undertaken only because of an engineer's suspi- 
cions) would unquestionably have caused a mis- 
sion failure. Analysis only suggested that there 
might be one problem; testing allowed discovery 
and solution of many related ones, including the 
original. 
Mariner 4, a good design, may well prove a 
model for future planetary spacecraft. The tech- 
niques used are simple and straightforward, yield- 
ing designs lightweight and efficient, with mini- 
mum operational problems. Above all, they work. 
I 
Mariner 4 Environmental Testing 
By WILLIAM S. SHIPLEY and JAMES E. MACLAY 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
A stringent technical and administrative order must protect the plan- 
etary project moving toward a fixed launch date; Mariner 4’s test 
program prompted 84 design changes 
The Mariner Mars environmental test program 
included estimating flight environments, estab- 
lishing general test specifications, reviewing 
detailed test specifications and selected test pro- 
cedures, monitoring the status of testing, and 
cerfifying environmental requirements. The activi- 
ties extend ’throughout evaluation of the flight en- 
vironment and encounter preparation. Other arti- 
cles in this issue of A / A  describe the Mariner Mars 
1964 (MM64) program and the spacecraft. Suf- 
fice it to say, by way of introduction, that the 
spacecraft, the mission, and the launch and flight 
environments transcended previous experiences. 
To meet program goals, environmental testing 
would be thorough and painstaking. 
Test Program Management. The emphasis 
placed on environmental testing by MM64 Proj- 
ect Management can be seen in numerous state- 
ments in the Project Policy and Requirements 
Document (PPRD) , a directive serving the proj- 
ect in much the same manner as the Constitution 
serves the W.S. Government. We quote this docu- 
ment often in the following paragraphs. (For a 
complete picture of MM64 management, see the 
article by Jack James on page 34.) 
The environmental test program was estab- 
lished by the following PPRD statements : 
“The project requirements shall be for environmental 
flight acceptance testing on all PTM (Proof Test Model), 
flight, and spare spacecraft equipment and environniental 
type approval (TA) testing on one complete set of TA 
spacecraft equipment, as a general rule at assembly level. 
All equipment must be made to pass these tests before 
it is considered acceptable for flight. 
“At the spacecraft system level the PTM tests shall 
be performed for qualification of the system design, 
analogous to the TA tests at the assembly level. The 
flight spacecraft system tests determine the flight ac- 
ceptability of each spacecraft. It is the over-all responsi- 
bility of the Spacecraft Systems Manager to establish the 
criteria of acceptance for these two test programs.” 
The Spacecraft Systems Manager was supported 
in the management of these test programs by an 
Environmental Requirements Project Representa- 
tive from JPL‘s Environmental Requirements Sec- 
tion. Besides this staff function, the Environmental 
Requirements Representative was responsible for 
the technical development of test requirements, a 
!ine function. 
During preliminary design of the spacecraft, a 
General Environmental Test Specification was 
prepared for the assemblies, and approved by the 
Project and Spacecraft Systems Managers. This 
General Specification established environmental 
conditions for tests (in sane cases defining pro- 
cedures for establishing the conditions) , but placed 
no explicit requirements on the equipment to be 
tested. 
Immediately following definition of the space- 
craft’s subsystem elements, an equipment list 
was issued identifying the equipment configura- 
tions that were to be tested as assemblies (to sat- 
isfy the General Specification) and subsequently 
stocked as replaceable spares. Engineers responsi- 
ble for the development of the assemblies then 
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prepared Environmental Test Specifications for 
them. These referred to the General Environ- 
mental Test Specification for environmental con- 
ditions, specified the performance requirements 
for each environment, and identified the equip- 
ment required to support the test. These Environ- 
mental Test Specifications were submitted to the 
Environmental Requirements Section for approval 
with regard to meeting the intent of the General 
Specification. Failure to obtain this approval re- 
quired a waiver from the General Environmental 
Test Specification approved by the Spacecraft Sys- 
tems Manager. An approved test specification or 
a waiver was required before any formal environ- 
mental testing. The Environmental Test Labora- 
tory provided the control “Toll Gate” to enforce 
this requirement. At the conclusion of the testing 
of an assembly, an Environmental Test Summary 
report was filed with the Environmental Require- 
ments Section for approval and reporting to the 
Project Manager, in accordance with the following 
guideline: 
“For each serial number of each equipment group sub- 
jected to  Environmental TA and FA Tests, a test report 
is to be made on a Test Results Summary Form. . . . 
The Summary Form is intended to keep a single and 
accurate record of the tests performed. The Summary 
Form is to be completed by the hardware supplying 
Division and supplied to the Environmental Requirements 
Project Representative immediately upon the passing of 
the tests. Included in the Test Results Summary Form 
will be the following items: 
(1) Tests covered and completion dates.. Reference 
Environmental Test Specification Numbers. 
(2) Signature of the cognizant engineer or person sup- 
porting test from the Division and signature of the QA 
representative if monitoring the test. 
(3) Environmental Lab’s test report form number (a 
copy of the test report is to be submitted if testing is 
done off the Laboratory). 
(4) List of all applicable failure reports. 
( 5 )  Serial numbers, reference designations and accu- 
mulated operating time. 
‘“The Environmental Requirements Group shall be re- 
quired to collect and appraise these reports, monitor the 
testing progress, and prepare for submission to the 
Spacecraft Systems Manager a Project Test Results Man- 
ual based on this information.” 
For the systems-level environmental tests, the 
General Specifications for the flight spacecraft 
were established, approved by the Spacecraft Sys- 
tems and Project Managers (again defining en- 
vironmental-test conditions), and incorporated 
into the appropriate portions of the Test and Op- 
erations Plan. These portions of the Test and Op- 
erations Plan required approval of the Environ- 
mental Requirements Section as did the assembly 
Environmental Test Specifications. Procedures 
were then generated by the operations personnel 
for the operation of the spacecraft and by the 
Environmental Test Laboratory for the control 
and monitoring of the test conditions. The latter 
procedures were reviewed by the Environmental 
Requirements Section. The systems-level environ- 
mental tests were witnessed, and the test condi- 
tions analyzed, by Environmental Requirements 
personnel for the Spacecraft Systems Manager. 
Release of these documents counted as project 
milestones, and their status duly monitored. The 
status of all testing was maintained and reports 
made in accordance with scheduled milestones 
(see Jack James’ discussion, page 34). 
The Environmental Test Specifications will be 
recognized as material included in Part IV of “De- 
ASSEMBLY-LEVEL TESTING 
r A  TEST LEVEL FA TEST LEVEL 
Bench Handliny 
Free-fall corner drop NA. 
Drop Test 
Height variable to weight NA. 
Transportation Vibration 
1.3 9, 2-35 CPS 
5.0 9, 48-500 cpr 
3.0 g, 35-48 cps 
N A  
NA. 
N.A. 
Explosive Atmosphero 
Fuel and air during assembly oporation N.A. 
Humidity 
757” humidity and varied temperature N.A. 
Shock 
Five 200-9, 0.7 * 0.2 millisec pulses, threo axes N.A. 
Static Acceleration 
* 14 g, throe axes, 5 min N.A. 
Vibration-Low-Frequency (Al l  Assemblies) 
* 1.5 in., 1-4.4 cps, 3 min: 3-9 peok from 
Vibration-Complex Wave (Assemb1l.a 2 10 Ib) 
44-15 cpr N.A. 
I 6.49 rms noise: 3 min 
9.0-9 rmr sin.. 40-250 cps is 6.0-9 rms sin., 40-250 cps 5.0-9 rms noise plus 2.0-9 rms sine, 11-40 cpr 
*4.5-9 rms sine, 250-2000 cps 
9.0-9 rms noiso: 6 roc 
I .5-9 rmr tine. 15-40 cpr 
P 3.0-9 rms nolre plus 
**3.0-a rms she. 250-2000 CPS 
Vacuum/Temperaturo ( t g  rms noiro: 6 set)  
- I O C ( 1 4 F ) : 4 h r  O C ( 3 2 F ) : Z h r  
7 5 C  (I67 F): 12 days 
<IO-‘-mm H g  < IO-‘-mm Hg 
5 5 C  ( I31  F): 40 hr 
Thermal Shock (for External Assemblies) 
75 C to -46 C ( I67 F to -50 F) N.A. 
@(Q.Ogfor assemblies<IOib). **(6.0gforauemblies~10lb). 
TEST’ ?ROORAM RESULTS 
Tort No. Tests No. Failures 
TA Test, Snmmary (Assembly Level) 
Bench ,handling 
Package drop 
Transportation vibration 
Humidity 
Explosive atmorphere 
Shock 
Static acceleration 
Low-frequency vibration 
Complex-wave vlbration 
Vacuum/temperature 
Thermal shock 
Total 
39 
39 
85 
51. 
19 
I I6  
89 
90 
154 
95 
28 
805 
-
0 
0 
0 
5 
0 
3 
0 
6 
24 
I 9  
I 
58 
-
FA Test Summary 
Vibration 538 26 
I 
Total 8 69 55 
Vacuum/temporature 310 28 
Special thermal 21 --
sign or Detailed Specs” in a standard military sys- 
tem. The need of separate specifications may be 
questioned by some. There are specific advantages 
to individually identifying this test documentation: 
1. Separation permits it to flow through a spe- 
cial approval channel, where it can be handled ex- 
pediently yet with appropriate technical consider- 
ation. 
2. I t  relates test requirements to the test con- 
figuration, which often differs markedly from the 
d_esign manufacturing configuration. 
3. It  is well suited to status monitoring car- 
ried throughout the program. 
This enumeration of procedures may strike the 
reader as tedious. Such procedures, we agree, do 
not kindle romance, but they do constitute the 
control essential for confidence in the excellence 
of a test program. 
Test Requirements. The General Environmental 
Specifications for MM64 Spacecraft Assemblies 
are summarized in the table at the left. The 
Type Approval (TA) tests were applied to sam- 
ples of each assembly to qualify the designs. Flight 
Acceptance (FA) tests were applied to each 
flight item as part of the certification of flight 
readiness. Environmental tests were likewise per- 
formed on the complete Proof Test Model (PTM) 
spacecraft for design qualification and on the flight 
spacecraft for certification. The table on page 45 
summarizes the system-level tests. 
The assembly-level TA tests were to qualify the 
equipment against all environments that the as- 
semblies would encounter, either as assemblies or 
part of the spacecraft. The TA tests were more 
severe than the extremes of the expected environ- 
ments, with a margin to allow for variations in 
equipment strength. 
The assembly-level FA tests, k i t e d  to two en- 
vironments in which equipment operation could 
be evaluated, and which could be simulated in a 
well-controlled manner, were intended to be as 
severe as the extremes of the expected flight con- 
ditions. Passage of the FA tests demonstrated the 
ability of the equipment to perform satisfactorily 
in the selected environments at levels at least as 
severe as flight. This information, added to inspec- 
tion results, provided implicit evidence that the 
equipment was similar to the TA units and thus 
capable of performing in all environments. 
The PTM testing included all environments 
modified by the presence of elements of the 
spacecraft. The assembly TA testing provided 
qualification against environments independent of 
the spacecraft, such as humidity, static accelera- 
tion, explosive atmosphere, etc. The assembly and 
the system designs then required further qualifica- 
tion, as a system, against environments with which 
the spacecraft interacts, such as shock, vibration, 
vacuum thermal conditions, and environmental R F  
radiation. In selecting these tests, emphasis was 
placed on environmental interactions, rather than 
performance interactions. Protection against per- 
formance interactions was provided by the assem- 
bly-level tests by monitoring assembly performance 
against specification requirements and by assembly 
and subassembly margin tecting Resides providing 
design qualification, the PTM tests (and assorted 
system-level mockup tests) provided environmen- 
tal data to increase the confidence in the adequacy 
of assembly-level tests or identify deficiencies in 
the designs, processes, or materials. 
Flight-spacecraft tests gave confidence in the 
ability of each complete spacecraft to perform its 
function in the extremes of environments expected 
to interact with the system. 
JPL policy is to set FA tests at the 95% level 
of the flight environment and the TA tests at a 
more severe level-above the 99% level-to the 
degree that such definition of the environment is 
possible. Even such a statistical statement re- 
quires elaboration for a specific environment. 
Consider random noise vibration. Here JPL has 
followed an approach used by several other aero- 
space organizations-!light-acceptance testing to 
a random spectrum constructed to envelop the 
95% points of maximum power-spectra densities 
from each 50-cps bandwidth of the existing data. 
A test based on such a spectra envelope will have 
a rms level typically 10 db above the mean rms 
level of the flight data in question. The duration 
of the test is then set equal to the time that the 
wideband vibration level is within 10 db of the 
maximum. Such a test is obviously a more severe 
experience than will be encountered on any one 
flight; but experience indicates that there is usu- 
ally one peak in the power-spectra density from a 
flight measurement within 3 db of the test level 
constructed in this manner. 
These paragraphs should at least impart the 
spirit of MM64 environmental-test selection. The 
sources of information on which the tests were 
based will now be examined. 
Some of the tests were based on military or 
aerospace requirements-for example, the bench- 
handling, ’drop, transportation-vibration, and ex- 
plosive-atmosphere tests. If equipment was not 
compatible with these tests, special handling pro- 
cedures were established and the test requirements 
were waived. Other environmental-test require- 
ments were based on spacecraft design informa- 
tion, experience, or special studies. The vacuum 
temperature test requirements for the assemblies 
were based on experience and on design data. 
The temperature test-range has been used for JPL 
spacecraft projects with only minor changes since 
Explorer 1. The technology of spacecraft thermal 
design permits a temperature environment well 
within this range for all inboard parts of the space- 
- 
Vibration I No. Pars Fail Failure 
SYSTEM LEVEL TESTING 
Vacuum/Thermal 
No. Pass Fail Failure 
T I  LEVEL FA LEVEL 
Space Simulator: 
Part I-( Systems validation) 
playback 
Launch through encounter and 
244 214 30 12.3 
I O  days a t  I P - m m  H g  
(o r  less) l o r  Iessl 
Space Simulation 
Part I l -Temparatu~-confrol verification 
IO8 hr a t  30- I34 watts 
simulated solar intensity 
250 hr at I P - m m  H g  
I34 hr a t  30-134 watts 
simulated solar intensity 
95 71  I 9  20.0 14.5 
Vibration-Sinusoidal 
Roll Axis Roll Axis 
5-1 5 cps, I .5-9 rms: I .6 rnin 20-200-20 cps, 0.5-9 rmr 
I5450 cps. 1.5-0 rms: 4.8 min 3% min 
450-800 cps, 5.0-g rms: 0.8 min 
80020oO cps, 10.0-9 rms (and TWO Lateral 
reverse sweep): 1.3 rnin 20-200-20 cpr, 0.5-9 rms 
3% min per axis 
Three Lateral Axes 
5-1 50 cps, 0.75-9 rms: 4.9 min 
150-450 cps, 1.25-g rms: 1.5 min 
450-800 cps, 5.00-9 rms: 0.8 min 
800-2000 cps. 10.00-g rms (and reverse sweep) : I .3 min 
Vibration-Noise 
Roll Axis & Three Lateral Axes Roll Axis & Two Lateral Axes 
Shaped spectra, 18.1-g rms Shaped spectra, IO-7-g rms 
over-all over-all 
3.0 rnin I min 
3 db/octave rolloff below 
550 cps 550 cps 
550-2000 CPS, 0.2 g’/cpS: 550-2000 CPS, 0.07-g/cps: 
3 db/octave rolloff below 
~ ~~ ~ ____ 
Vibration-Torsional 
Two 69-cpr pulses, 205 
rad/secz, 0.14 sec 
rad/sec*, 6.0 min 
rad/sec’, 5.5 sec 
20-1 50-20 CPS, 12-86 
50- 150-50 CPS, I54 
N.A. 
Acoustic 
Approximately 142-d b shaped 
spectrum, 90 sac N.A. 
Shock 
Shroud V-band release fir ing N.A. 
S/C separation V-band N.A. 
release fir ing 
A l l  S/C pyrotechnics fired 
Electromagnetic Interference-RF Susceptibility 
Launch-complex RF Launch-complex RF 
Agena-telemetry RF Agena-telemetry RF 
C-band beacon C-band beacon 
All  S/C pyrotechnics fired 
V A C U U M I T H E R M I L  
AND VIBRATION TEST RESULTS 
rate, of 
% I Tests 
craft. Outboard parts, such as the solar panels 
and antennas, required special testing beyond 
the scope of the General Specifications, but com- 
pletely defined in the environmental test specifica- 
tion for their assemblies. MM64 spacecraft as 
satisfactory in thermal design was verified by sys- 
tems-level space simulator tests. 
Certain tests, such as vibration and shock, re- 
quired special studies. At the outset of MM64, 
vibration tests for the assemblies were based on 
vibration data from the Ranger project, since 
both used the AtlasIAgena launch vehicle. Ex- 
amination of data from other vehicles lead to the 
conclusion that the spacecraft vibration environ- 
ment was stro’ngly influenced by the shape of the 
vehicle nose fairing, or shroud. Unfortunately, the 
Mariner Mars nose fairing was different than 
Ranger’s. An examination of wind-tunnel data, 
again from other vehicles, indicated that the 
Mariner Mars vibration environment could be 
noticeably different than Ranger’s. With little time 
available for research, the vibration test-levels, 
spectrum, and duration were changed. In after-the- 
fact support of this change, scale-model wind-tun- 
ne1 tests were made by Lewis Research Center and 
the data used by JPL for estimating transonic 
acoustic fields. Acoustic-admittance measurements 
were made on a Mariner shroud and mockup 
spacecraft, and the resulting data applied to esti- 
mates of the acoustic field to predict flight-vibra- 
tion environment. The results of these studies sup- 
ported the change, and when combined with test 
and flight data provided basic information for pre- 
dicting spacecraft environments. 
Although tables on pages 44-45 summarize the 
basic tests for the assemblies and spacecraft, a 
number of additional tests were made on selected 
assemblies as a result of continued study of the 
environment. These included shroud RF-attenua- 
tion and coupling tests to determine power levels 
to which the spacecraft would be exposed, low- 
speed (handling) impact tests to investigate the 
qualification of the complete spacecraft relative to 
certain features of the operations environment, 
high-gain-antenna combined heating and vibration 
tests to qualify the antenna against the aerody- 
namic heating and vibration environment during 
the second-stage operation, and electron-radia- 
tion tests. These are but a few of many special 
tests documented in the “Mariner Mars Test Re- 
sults Manual,” a document which in summary 
form is an inch-and-a-half thick, supported by 
volumes of test results. 
TeAt-Program Results. One way of evaluating 
an environmental test program is by examining the 
failures that occurred and their effect on the hard- 
ware flown. The tables on pages 44-45, 47 sum- 
marize the Mariner environmental test program. 
The following comments on the results of the 
assembly-level testing provide some insight to the 
nature of the problems encountered and reaction 
of the spacecraft hardware to the various environ- 
ments created for testing. 
1. The five failures in TA humidity were due 
to the selection of an unrealistic, overly severe test 
environment. The test condition resulted in meas- 
urable quantities of water inside the test item. 
The spec was modified. There were no failures 
observed in subsequent testing. 
2. Of the 24 failures in TA complex wave 
vibration tests, 14 resulted in redesign and seven 
were caused by workmanship errors in manufac- 
turing process. 
3. Of the 19 failures during TA vacuum/ 
temperature tests, eight resulted in redesign and 
three were caused by workmanship errors in manu- 
facturing process. 
4. Four of the TA vibration failures involved 
vacuum tubes (a  photomultiplier and a vidicon 
tube); these are the only vacuum tubes in the 
spacecraft, so this represented an abnormally high- 
failure incidence. The failures were localized to 
the dynode structures, which seemed to be quite 
susceptible in the range of 400-600 cps. Both 
units eventually passed TA vibration test, one by 
making the dynode structure more rugged and the 
other by isolating the vacuum tube itself. 
5 .  Of the 55 FA failures, 14 resulted in re- 
design; the rest were caused by workmanship flaws 
or operator errors. 
6. The high incidence, proportionally, of fail- 
ures in complex-wave vibration and vacuum/ 
thermal tests indorse the selection of these en- 
vironments for FA tests. 
The environmentjd test program definitely af- 
fected improvement in the design and quality of 
the equipment flown. A total of 84 design changes 
were incorporated as a result of environmental 
testing. The trend of improvement between TA 
and FA testing is evidenced by the reduction in 
failure rate shown in the table on page 44. The 
improvement achieved by proper testing is sonie- 
what clouded by the fact that some of the FA 
failures reflected design deficiencies that would 
have been detected if TA had preceded FA, and 
the corrective actions incorporated before pro- 
duction of flight equipment rather than after ex- 
periences in testing. 
The improvement in equipment quality can 
more readily be seen by comparing the number of 
failures encountered in subsystem testing with that 
encountered in system testing, as has been done 
in the table on page 47. (It  must be remembered 
that over half of the assemblies FA-tested were 
later subjected to systems-level environmental 
tests.) The improvement is even more striking 
when it is realized that only three of the 16 fail- 
ures in system-level tests appear to have been 
I ' .  
SYSTEM-LEVEL TEST FAILURES 
* 
Test Number of Failures 
PTM FA 
Space Simulator 
Part I 
Part II 
\,.L..*? ._ 
I I", a, l"ll 
Acoustic 
Shock 
EM1 
Total 
4 
I 
2 
I 
0 
0 
0 
- 
6 
I 
: 
0 
0 
0 
8 
- 
amenable to detection at the assembly level. The 
remainder were associated with environmental in- 
teractions or ancillary equipment unsuitable for 
assembly tests. 
Independent of the test failures, the technical 
adequacy of an environmental test program can be 
appraised by a comparison of the environment to 
which equipment is subjected during test X with 
that encountered during flight. Although knowl- 
edge of the actual flight environment is limited 
by telemetry capacity, certain features of the 
launch dynamic environment and space-flight 
thermal environment are reasonably defined by ex- 
isting data. The graphs on page 43 indicate an 
adequate margin between the vibration from the 
liftoff and transonic portions of flight and the 
test requirements. The figures present power- 
spectra densities of the vibration measured in 
the axial direction at the attachment between 
spacecraft adapter and launch vehicle. The test 
environment for the same axis as the flight meas- 
urement is represented by the mean power-spectra 
density of six measurements of the input accelera- 
tion, i.e., at the spacecraft adapter t? test fixture 
interface. In the table at bottom, flight tempera- 
tures at  25 locations on the spacecraft are treated 
statistically and compared to the assembly-level 
vacuum/temperature test requirements. 
Conclusions and Implications. MM64 space- 
craft equipment was subjected to an orderly and 
conservative environmental test program. The 
rigorous use of clearly defined general-testing re- 
quirements enabled attention to be focused on 
identified problems, and contributed to the timely 
FLIGHT VS. TEST TEMPERATURES 
All temperatures, C. 
Mean I -a FA test TA test 
temp variation temp temp 
Temperatures a t  18 locations interior t o  spacecraft. 
23 5 55 and 0 75 and -10 
Temperatures a t  six locations exterior to spacecraft. 
thermal transient 
. _ _ _  -~ . . ~ - _ _ _ ~  
23 20 55 and 0 75 and -10 plus 
of 75 to -46 
accomplishment of the test program. The regi- 
mentation of the testing activity permitted Project 
Management to approach the launch with confi- 
dence in the integrity of the spacgcraft. 
From the data accumulated in this program a 
number o f  conclusions can be drawn, adminis- 
trRtive and technic?!. -A!!hmigh the specter nf 
"limited sample" hangs over these conclusions, 
they do not defy common sense and indeed sup- 
port rules of thumb which have been used for 
many years. Some observations and inferences : 
1. Many of the TA envirbnmental tests caused 
no failures. There is a strong implication here 
that if a unit passes certain key environmental 
tests, it will pass all tests that involve the same 
type of stress. Complex-wave vibration and vac- 
uum/temperature would be the key tests. It is not 
unreasonable to assume that a barebones TA 
environmental test program for Mariner could 
have deleted all the handling environments, ex- 
plosive atmosphere, and static acceleration and 
still have produced quality hardware, provided op- 
erational restraints (such as shipping containers 
and conformal coating) were substituted. A cau- 
tionary word here; we do not advocate simply 
dropping certain tests. We suggest that by pur- 
posefully structuring certain key tests and ac- 
knowledging certain operational constraints, it 
appears reasonable to drop less-productive tests. 
2. The humidity test, which resulted in five 
failures, was admittedly overly severe. It is fur- 
ther true that one plans for a controlled atmos- 
phere throughout the equipment-use cycle, yet a 
unit which had waived the humidity test failed in 
the lab when the air conditioning was shut down 
for servicing. It seems advisable to retain this test 
and thereby avoid severe operational restraints. 
3. The shock test caused three failures,. all 
latching-relay malfunctions. (There were no relay 
malfunctions during vibration.) Although this rep- 
resents a small failure rate, since each shock test 
involved 15 repetitions and the spacecraft com- 
plement contained dozens of relays, there is an 
indication of fragility of latching relays in a shock 
environment. This shock test was to simulate the 
effects of the firing of pyrotechnic devices-a 
high-g, high-frequency phenomenon. Nothing 
should be inferred from this about other shock 
phenomena, such as cushioned impact, which is 
a low-frequency phenomenon. The mechanism of 
failure is not fully understood; it may even be 
related to workmanship. Lengthy tests were run 
on a large sample to determine if the relays con- 
tinually degraded with repetitive shocks. A few 
failed initially, but it was not until about the 45 
test that others began to fail, at which time the 
entire sample began to show degradation. (Lest 
there be any misunderstanding, we do not wish to 
even hint that enough data exists to propose shock 
as a standardized screening test! ) 
4. Of the 55 FA test failures, 14 resulted in re- 
design. Although it does not show in the data, 10 
of these 14 tests had not been preceded by the 
TA test. The remaining four failures were identical 
on each of the four flight units of one subsystepl. 
The nature of the failure was very subtle, and it is 
felt by the subsystem personnel that the same 
anomaly should have been seen during the TA 
test. Discounting these four FA failures then, all 
10 of the 10 FA environmental test failures 
which resulted in redesign had one thing in 
common-TA testing had clot yet occurred. To 
an organization which produces many copies of 
each product, this may not seem a very profound 
conclusion. But an organization which produces 
one prototype and a few flight units on a short 
schedule is continually beset to expedite one unit 
at the expense of others. To such an organization, 
the price of subordinating the TA testing may be 
many redesigns, very late in the project. 
5.  Vacuum tubes (photomultiplier and vidicon 
types specifically) represent a very vulnerable vi- 
bration soft-spot. Our problems were eventually 
overcome with much special design effort; the tube 
applications were subject to severe function de- 
mands, and many possible fixes would have com- 
promised the functional performance. Neither of 
the final fixes (ruggedized structure in one applica- 
tion, isolation in the other) would have been dif- 
ficult in the initial design. Therefore, we conclude 
that every vacuum-tube application should be 
viewed from the very outset as a vibration prob- 
lem amenable to solution. 
6. The 10 workrnanship errors detected during 
T A  environmental testing indicate the need for a 
pre-TA test, which could be identical to the FA 
test, to fortify the qualification concept. 
7. The failures detected during system-level 
environmental testing illustrate certain unavoid- 
able deficiencies in the assembly-level testing : 
Some units, such as cables, are not amenable to 
assembly-level tests; the assembly-level test may 
be inadequate for units located in an environmen- 
tal extreme (e.g., a cantilever); and degradation 
can occur between assembly-level FA testing and 
incorporation into a spacecraft. We definitely ad- 
vocate system-level environmental testing. 
We believe that we can identify events which 
contribute to the success of Mariner 4 to date, as 
we write, and others which could have jeopardized 
success. We believe further that the administra- 
tive and technical activities described here will be 
essential to success in planetary projects with fixed 
launch dates. 
' 
-Assuring Quality 
and Reliability for Mariner 4 n 
By RICHARD A. WELNICK and FRANK H. WRIGHT 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
A hallmark of the modern engineering development, thorough and 
painstaking work accompanied every step of the Mariner Mars Pro/- 
oct to assure the quality and reliability of hardware 
Many and various constraints of the Mariner Mars 
1964 Project, as described by Jack James on page 
34, gave a special edge to its quality-assurance and 
reliability effort. Launches to Mars do not come 
often. 
Project Management established quality and re- 
liability representation to control its detailed QA 
and R operations. This article for the most part 
describes its work-a thorough and painstaking 
investigation of all hardware. Nothing new was 
invented for the work. Proven techniques were 
applied to monitor and control the quality and re- 
liability of the Mariner test and flight spacecraft. 
A grasp of what this entails will serve every aero- 
space engineer and planner well. 
QuaZity-Assurance (QA)  Program. To meet 
quality-control and inspection needs, a senior QA 
engineer was assigned to each hardware-fabrica- 
tion area. Each of these senior engineers super- 
vised a permanently assigned group of inspectors. 
This organization enabled QA personnel to be- 
come acquainted early with the engineering func- 
tions and peculiarities of MM64 hardware and 
packaging concepts. It also facilitated training 
inspection personnel, since their learning curve 
could closely parallel the design, development, 
manufacture, and test of !light hardware. This ap- 
proach also made possible intimate knowledge of 
the peculiarities of vendors and their manafactur- 
ing and inspection systems and methods. 
JPL resident inspectors were assigned to ven- 
dors according to the volume of work, criticality 
role, and QA ability of each manufacturer. Senior 
QA engineers monitored them through periodic 
visits. Constant contact resulted in a rapid indoc- 
trination of vendors to JPL ways, and made them 
aware of the quality level sought. 
~ This field operation was supported by a parts- 
oriented QA group and a mechanical inspection 
and metrology group, both located at JPL. And, 
as a final checkpoint, an independent inspection 
group provided redundant inspection at the JPL 
Spacecraft Assembly Facility (SAF), since all 
. 
hardware delivered, installed, or removed from the 
spacecraft was controlled and reinspected there. 
Quality Systems and Procedures. At the be- 
ginning of MM64, a group was formed to unify 
and standardize procedures and forms and to gen- 
erate QA basic policy statements. I t  concerned it- 
self chiefly with the Vendor Surveys (VS), the 
Quality Assurance Procedure (QAP) , and the 
Quality Assurance Instruction (QAI). 
QAPS are JPL-wide policy documents that de- 
lineate the guidelines to be followed in all areas 
under QA discipline. They are based on JPL 
packaging and process-engineering specifications. 
QAIs are hardware-oriented documents submitted 
by the vendor and approved by cognizant JPL QA 
groups. Over 100 QAIs and Flow Plans were re- 
leased for use on MM64 hardware. VSs measure 
the vendor’s ability to control the quality of his 
hardware. Conducted independently of JPL de- 
sign personnel, but at their request, the VSs en- 
abled JPL procurement, design, and QA repre- 
sentatives to doublecheck the caliber of a supplier. 
Some 200 VSs were made for MM64. 
In-process Inspection. In-process inspection 
was the most important single action in control- 
ling and measuring the quality level of MM64 
hardware. 
A QAI and a Flow Plan constituted the basic 
guideline documents for in-piocess inspection. 
They showed where, when, and how individual 
pieces of hardware were to be inspected and ac- 
cepted, and by whom. 
Acceptance criteria were listed in the QAI for 
each inspection point, and specific JPL workman- 
ship specifications were referenced when applica- 
ble. The QAI  and Flow Plan specified points and 
types of inspection for both JPL and vendors. The 
QAI resulted in 1500 specified JPL inspection 
points during the in-process phase of hardware 
manufacture, plus 256 final JPL inspection points. 
Documenting the history of Mariner hardware 
was a major responsibility of the QA organization. 
A11 inspections were documented and record 
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copies forwarded to a documentation center. After 
the Mariner 3 and 4 launches, an audit of the 
documentation center revealed that the predeter- 
mined controlled inspections of the QAIs resulted 
in the performance of 25,400 inspections of elec- 
tronic hardware, not including mechanical or part 
inspections. 
Filed in the documentation center are also pho- 
tographs of each subsystem at time of delivery to 
the Spacecraft Assembly Facility. QA documenta- 
tion, filed by serialized subsystem and spacecraft, 
forms a history of each Mariner spacecraft and its 
integral parts. 
Spacecraft-Equipment Certification at SA F .  
This process traced the history of the hardware 
being submitted for assembly, and confirmed and 
substantiated its condition at receipt. The cer- 
tification process consisted of a documentation 
review, an inspection, color photographs of the 
hardware, disposition of any open items, and sign- 
off by design and QA engineers. This redundant, 
toll-gate inspection by QA personnel served to 
monitor the efficiency of the in-process inspection 
process and verified the validity of the criteria 
being used for acceptance during prior inspections. 
Quality Assurance at Cape Kennedy (AFETR). 
Inspectors monitored packing of all spacecraft 
and support hardware for shipment to AFETR. 
To provide proper QA coverage at the launch site, 
a QA supervisor, three mechanical inspectors, and 
three QA spacecraft inspectors were sent to Cape 
Kennedy. A controlled-access stockroom was es- 
tablished, and all movement of hardware to or 
from the Cape was QA-controlled. All packages 
were closed with tamper-proof seals and were 
opened only under inspection surveillance. As 
each spacecraft arrived at AFETR, all pieces of 
hardware were inspected for shipment damage 
and humidity effects. After acceptance, complete 
100% control of all hardware was imposed, and 
round-the-clock surveillance of the spacecraft was 
conducted by QA. All movement of hardware to 
or from the flight spacecraft was documented, and 
“spacecraft status” logs were issued after each 
major event. These rigorous controls continued 
right up to the launchings. 
Post-launch QA effort consisted of monitoring 
proper storage of spare Mariner spacecraft, flight 
spares and preparing final spacecraft-status logs. 
Reliability Program. The reliability responsibil- 
ities for MM64 were concentrated in several areas, 
such as Design Groups, subcontractor reliability 
organizations, and the MM64 Project Office, with 
centralizing authority in a monitor organization. 
The main tasks of this monitor group covered 
surveillance and coordination, including attend- 
ance at design reviews; development and main- 
tenance of a Problem and Failure Reporting 
System; a continuous audit of the reliability status 
of hardware; and monitoring information flow 
among subsystem-fabrication groups, subsystem 
and system test-complexes, the space-flight opera- 
tions area, the launch-vehicle area, and system 
management. 
Problem Failure Reporting. JPL‘s Problem and 
Failure Reporting (PFR) System for Mariner 
was planned as a closed loop to give effective 
notice, distribution, analysis, and corrective action 
of all reported anomalies. Since MM64 did not 
involve the quantities of hardware and paperwork 
associated with a full-scale production program, 
it was decided not to automate the paper flow, but 
instead to keep reporting more personal. Anyone 
could originate a PFR who believed a problem 
or failure existed. PFRs were written at JPL, at 
Cape Kennedy, and, during the actual flight, at 
(I 
RELIABILITY TARGET-MARINER SUBSYSTEM PARTS 
This chart will give the reader an idea of the parts distribution on the Mariner spacecraft. The listing includes all the major elec- 
tronic and electromagnetic part types, but does not give a count of such parts as solar cells and connectors. 
Subsystem Transistors Resistors Capacitors Diodes Transformers Relays Totals 
-~ - ~- _ _  ~- __ - 
and Coils 
- _ _ _ _ - ~ -  _- 
Radio 
Command 
Power 
Central computer and sequencer 
Da:a encoder 
Attitude control 
Pyrotechnic 
Thmnal 
Video storage 
Data automation’ 
Cxmic  ray telescope 
Cosmic dust detector 
Trapped-radiation detector 
Ion chamber 
Scan 
Plasma probe 
Helium magnetometer 
Television 
1 I 9  
296 
I19 
2 66 
969 
I73 
2 
181 
939 
I93 
I I 7  
46 
20 
65 
243 
I04 
254 
-632 
737 
375 
1061 
3456 
75 I 
I02 
52 
63 6 
3280 
469 
359 
I34 
207 
. 206 
52 I 
376 
919 
“Includes pulse-width converters. blncludes 2640 memory cores. 
~ .~ -~ ~ 
553 
342 
I37 
256 
1617 
388 
28 
20 I 
620 
257 
I39 
56 
68 
82 
I37 
205 
34 I 
220 
702 
220 
718 
I490 
435 
60 
266 
3825 
253 
70 
40 
40 
I04 
375 
19 
412 
62 
46 
44 
15 
I I 3  
28 
6 
12 
I 
13 
4 
3 
15 
6 
20 
I O  
273Eb 
4 
IO 
28 
8 
36 
8 
4 
7 
5 
3 
-~ 
I590 
2123 
905 
2344 
7653 
1811 
206 
52 
I303 
I 1,402 
I173 
698 
280 
338 
479 
1282 
789 
I939 
36,364 
c 
I n7 
[ AFETR OPER I 
I FLIGHT f 
This Problem Failure Report (PFR) record on MM64 indicates the exacting concern for detail in the program- 
almost 1500 PFRs were written on test, flight. and operational-support equipment. 
I 
JPL Space Flight Operations Facility. 
The PFR System hinged on the relationship 
among each subsystem's cognizant engineer (indi- 
vidual responsible for analysis and corrective ac- 
tion on each PFR), his Section Manager, and the 
Mariner Spacecraft Project Engineer, who had 
final authority for evaluating analysis and correc- 
tive action on the spacecraft system before PFR 
closeout. This interaction permitted the cognizant 
engineer to take the degree of corrective action 
on his subsystem that he felt necessary, such as 
having parts-failure analysis performed or starting 
a design-change action. At the same time, by his 
sign-off responsibility, the cognizant engineer's 
Section Manager was made aware of the prob- 
lems or failures occurring on the subsystems under 
his control. Ir? making a final sign-off, the Proj- 
ect Engineer incorporated his knowledge of the 
spacecraft-%ow each PFR, failure analysis, or 
design change might affect the total system. 
Environmental Testing. Although conducted by 
another group (see page 42) ,  environmental test- 
ing was an integral part of the reliability program. 
Two classes of tests were most significant- 
Type Approval (TA) and Flight Acceptance (FA), 
both done at the subsystem and system level as 
well as flight-configuration hardware. The TA is a 
kind of worst-case test to verify design. TA testing 
demonstrates that an assembly can satisfactorily 
operate in worse environment than expected; it is 
not specifically intended to be destructive. To pass 
TA, equipment could suffer no performance deg- 
radation. T A  testing was composed of such 
environments as handling shock, transportation 
vibration, explosive atmosphere, humidity, R F  
interference, shock, static acceleration, and vibra- 
tion. After successful testing, TA hardware was 
put on a life-test program; it was not intended for 
flight use. 
FA testing was used on MM64 as a final check- 
point to verify fabrication techniques. The ade- 
quacy of the equipment design was established by 
TA tests; FA tests confirmed workmanship. They 
were composed of environmental and performance 
tests similar to TA tests but at nominal levels. The 
combination of these two levels of environmental 
testing proved very successful, especially for indi- 
cating and eliminating design deficiencies and qual- 
ity problems. 
- In all, there were 805 TA subsystem tests and 
846 subsystcm FA tests performed on MM64 
hardware. 
Reliability Prediction and Failure-modes Anal- 
ysis. Jack James comments on this work in his 
article (see page 34) and cites Planning Research 
Corp. (PRC) reports. Most of the design changes 
recommended by PRC concerned increasing sub- 
system reliability through redundancy. Its reports 
discussed typical failure modes, design interfaces, 
and success probabilities for each functional unit. 
Design Review. Starting in the spring of 1963, 
design review was made on all the major space- 
craft subsystems, on hardware designed and fabri- 
cated at JPL, and at subcontractor plants. The 
Mariner Spacecraft System Manager chaired the 
Design Review Board. Typical design-review tech- 
niques were used, such as check lists and circuit 
analyses. 
Parts-reliubility Program. The reliability mar- 
gins of the Mariner spacecraft were greatly in- 
creased by the JPL partsLscreening program. The 
original requirement was for 100% electronic and 
electromechanical parts screening for all qualifi- 
cation-test, flight, Qnd spare spacecraft hardware. 
This was relaxed somewhat in October 1963 due 
to schedule slippage; of the some 3 1,000 electronic 
and electromechanical parts on a single Mariner 
spacecraft, approximately 95 % were screened. 
For the whole project, some 350,000 parts were 
screened. The process involved burn-in and 
parameter-drift screening, although some parts 
received more-sophisticated attention. Normal 
burn-in included 168 hr at the manufacturer’s 
rated conditions for each part. Drift screening 
involved taking each part and testing it under 
normal conditions against rigid allowable-drift 
tolerance parameters, derived from parts-qualifi- 
cation data. Evidence of this program’s value 
exists in the successful elimination of large num- 
bers of marginal parts and in the failure-free oper- 
ation of most of the Mariner 4 equipment during 
its many months of cruise operations, in inter- 
planetary deep-space missions. 
Failure Analysis. Failure analysis was per- 
formed on approximately 110 individual parts at 
JPL during the course of MM64. Failure analysis 
was also conducted at the plants of major sub- 
system subcontractors. 
Many electronic parts caused problems, and 
necessitated various failure investigations. For 
example, a typical laboratory investigation of a 
failed transistor included thorough electrical char- 
acterization at several temperatures, hermetic-seal 
tests, analysis of gases within the case, electron- 
microprobe analysis of certain metallic materials, 
and metallurgical sectioning to examine internal 
structure. A typical investigation not only required 
the talents of specialists in electronics, but alsd 
specialists in chemistry, metallurgy, and physics. 
MM64 made use of a preferred-parts list based 
on extensive JPL qualification and use data. The 
list covers the electronic parts for all JPL elec- 
tronic equipment requiring high reliability-equip- 
ment supplied by subcontractors as well as fabri- 
cated at JPL. The list involved preparing 487 de- 
tailed part specifications. 
Concluding Remarks. Presently, reliability anal- 
ysis is being performed on testing and failure data 
collected on the Mariner program, both during 
ground-based activities and the actual flight. These 
studies are intended to supply information for fu- 
ture JPL space efforts, especially Surveyor and 
Voyager. 
c 
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Mariner 4 tlight Dath lo Mars 
In a planetary mission giving the same order of accuracy as Ranger, 
this spacecraft demonstrates again the high performance of Earth-based 
radio guidance coupled with a single-impulse midcourse correction 
By N. R. HAYNES, I. R. MICHEL, G. W. NULL, and R. K. SLOAN 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
On Nov. 28, 1964,. the Mariner 4 
spacecraft was launched from Cape 
Kennedy toward Mars by an Atlas/ 
Agena launch vehicle, its primary 
urpose being to optain scientific in- 
Formation about this planet. 
Mariner 4 carries TV equipment, 
field and particle experiments, and an 
“occultation” experiment. The TV 
equipment has been devised to. return 
21 pictures of Mars with much higher 
resolution than Earth-based telescopes 
give. The field and particle experi- 
ments are intended to measure Mars’ 
magnetic field and any trapped radia- 
tion associated with it. The occulta- 
tion experiment will attempt to meas- 
ure pressure and density in Mars’ at- 
mosphere through observation of 
changes in a radio signal passing 
through the planet’s atmosphere on its 
way back to Earth. 
AS we write, the spacecraft is per- 
forming satisfactorily, and is heading 
for a close approach to Mars on July 
14, 1965-about 5700 mi. From the 
surface. This article concerns the 
choice of point of closest approach, 
or aiming point, that optimizes data 
return from scientific instruments and 
the midcourse guidance and orbit-de- 
termination methods for achieving it. 
We can begin by defining the aim- 
ing-point coordinate system. The aim- 
ing-point plane(B plane) is erpen- 
dicular to the direction of &e ap- 
proach asymptote of the near-Mars 
hyperbola and passes through the 
center of the planet.6 Within this 
plane, the aiming point, called the 
“impact parameter” (B), is defined by 
the value of the perpendicular dis- 
tance from the center of the planet to 
the incoming asymptote. The sketch 
on page 29 illustrates this geometry. 
The T axis is parallel to the ecliptic 
and R = S x T where S = unit vec- 
tor in the direction of the approach 
asymptote. The aiming point is then 
specified by either B-T and B.R or b 
and e, as illustrated. 
Operational Constraints and Scien- 
tific Value. For a given pair of launch 
and arrival days, the direction of the 
incoming asymptote of the areocentric 
trajectory is approximately constant. 
This fact permits the operational con- 
straints and scientific value to be rep- 
resented by contours on the aiming- 
point plane. Three parameters could 
be specified independently for each 
day. Chosen were the time of arrival, 
distance of the incoming asymptote 
from the center of Mars, (the impact 
parameter, b), and an angle specify- 
ing the azimuthal position of incoming 
asymptote on aiming point plane, e. 
As a first step, the,time the space- 
craft would arrive at Mars was set 
for a period when the 100-kw trans- 
miver at the Goldstone Tracking Sta- 
tion could “see” the encounter ‘and 
send commands if necessary at critical 
stages of the flyby. The time choice 
determined the longitudinal region of 
Mars to be viewed by the TV camera 
and affected some of the operational 
procedures for assuring a good occul- 
tation experiment. Fortunately, the 
objectives of both the TV and oc- 
cultation experiments could be met 
using the particular time selected, and 
thus the aiming-point selection could 
be made by specifying the two values, 
b and e. . 
Operational constraints from the 
mutual interaction between space- 
craft and trajectory design specify 
certain prohibited regions in the aim- 
ing-point plane. Piercing these re- 
gions causes total mission loss or seri- 
ously degrades mission objectives. The 
chart on page 30 shows the prohibited 
N O R M A N  R. HAYNES (top left) a systems analysis project engineer at JPL 
for Mariner 4, also heads operations of the flight-path analysis team 
that determines and corrects Mariner 4 trajectory. JOHN R. MICHEL (top 
right) a mathematician-engineer in the space guidance group of JPL‘s 
Systems Div., did Mariner 4 preflight guidance analysis and assisted post- 
launch maneuver operations. GEORGE W. NULL (below left) works in the orbit 
determination group, performing orbit analyses on the Mariner 2 
Venus probe and Mariner 4 Mars probe. RICHARD K. SLOAN (below right) 
serves as project scientist on Mariner 4. and has performed payload definition 
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The impact parameter, or point of closest approach, i s  defined by the perpendicular distance from the center 
of the planet to the incoming asymptote of the space vehicle. 
areas in dash line and the bound- 
aries of the individual consiraints. The 
line C P M  = 36 deg bounds the re- 
gion within which the angle Canopus- 
Spacecraft-Mars becomes less than 
36 deg at some time. In this region, 
the Canopus tracker might follow 
stray light from Mars and roll the 
spacecraft, causing loss of communi- 
cation to Earth. The line S P M  = 0 
indicates the region within which the 
Sun would be hidden by Mars, caus- 
ing loss of power and undesirable 
thermal transients. The line I M P  = 
10-4 surrounding the planet bounds 
the region for which the a priori prob- 
ability of impacting Mars is greater 
than 1 in 10,000. That is, if a single 
maneuver were performed to attempt 
a passage within this region, the mid- 
course execution errors and trajec- 
tory uncertainties would give a prob- 
ability of impact greater than 10-4 
and violate the NASA contamination 
constraint. 
Contours in the aiming-point plane 
express values for the scientific ex- 
~ 
periments. In each case, the experi- 
ment value ranges from 1.0-for tra- 
jectories where the chances of fulfilling 
the experiment objectives are ex- 
pected to be greatest-to zero, where 
either no data or no significant data 
can be expected. The gradations be- 
tween the extremes indicate the ex- 
pected partial success. The contours 
for the fields and particles experi- 
ments are time-independent. The tele- 
vision contours depend on arrival date 
and time, and the occultation contours 
depend on both launch date and ar- 
rival date. 
Mariner 4's magnetometer, trapped 
radiation detector (TRD) , ionization- 
chamber ( ION),  and cosmic-ray-tele- 
scope (CRT) experiments all require 
the spacecraft to pass within Mars' 
magnetopause, which has uncertain 
size. However, similitude arguments 
plus an assumption of the largest pos- 
sible magnetic moment of Mars (one- 
tenth that of Earth) give a rough in- 
dication of its maximum extent. The 
value of each of these experiments in- 
creases rapidly with decreasing dis- 
tance to the planet and can be re- 
lated to the detectability of an in- 
creasingly smaller value for the ratio 
of Mars' dipole strength to Earth's. 
The following equations give an ap- 
proximate relation between the value 
of these experiments and the aiming 
point described by b and e: 
Value of magnetometer - 
Value of the TRD, ION, and CRT 
With b in kilometers: ~~ ~ 
S = V l + 3 s i n ' e  
The TV-value contours have been 
constructed by combining the effects 
of several television experiment pa- 
rameters according to the equation 
v T V  = v R v I ~ v F  (0.5 VT + 0.5 vSF) 
The quantity uH decreases where the 
the spacecraft-planet distance during 
SP~CECRAFT CONSTRAINTS AT THE AIMING POINT 
the TV encounter sequence is greater 
than 30,000 km, expressing the de- 
crease in TV-experiment value as dis- 
tance degrades resolution. The quan- 
tity wB expresses the degradation of 
picture quality caused by blur; as the 
spacecraft-planet distance decreases 
below about 16,000 km, vB decreases. 
It also depends on the angle between 
the camera axis and the spacecraft 
velocity vector during TV encounter. 
The quantity vF accounts for the fact 
that, as the frame size decreases with 
decreasing distance to the planet, it 
will become difficult to correlate TV- 
picture information with known sur- 
face features on the planet. 
The quantity vT depends on 
whether terminator coverage will be 
obtained. For e values greater than 
about 60 deg, the locus of pictures 
across the planet foreshortens enough 
to exclude the terminator. However, 
UT does not fall off abruptly at this 
point because pictures near the termi- 
nator are also expected to show sur- 
face irregularities, although with less 
certainty. 
The quantity vSF indicates the ex- 
pected coverage of various surface 
240 270 300 
330 210 
0 180 
x, 150 
120 90 60 
TV value contours and Earth occultation region. 
features and the bright-dark transi- 
tions between them. This quantity is 
time-dependent, since the rotation of 
the planet changes the surface fea- 
ture presented to the TV camera. The 
chart at bottom of this page shows 
a typical set of TV-value contours. 
These contour lines cover only half of 
the aiming-point plane because the 
pianetary scan cannot point at Mars 
in the other half. 
The occultation-experiment value 
contours obviously fall entirely within 
the Earth occultation region projected 
on the aiming-point plane (labeled 
EPM = 0 in the chart just cited). 
Within the occultation region two 
types of value degradation can occur. 
First, the spacecraft passes close to 
the edge of the planet during occul- 
tation, and the magnitude of doppler 
velocity change will be decreased 
then. The region for this will be rela- 
tively small, permitting the occultation 
value to be approximated by a dis- 
continuous change from one to zero. 
Second, with increasing miss distance, 
the spacecraft signal will be increas- 
ingly attenuated by differential re- 
fraction in the planet’s atmosphere. 
To select the final aiming point, it 
would normally be necessary to com- 
promise among the demands of the 
individual experiments by weighing 
each against some value and plotting 
composite contours to indicate the 
optimum aiming point for the mission 
as a whole. It fortuitously turned out, 
however, that the final aiming-point 
selection for Mariner 4 was almost 
independent of weighting, i.e., the 
three experiments called for approxi- 
mately the same aiming point. The 
aiming point finally selected was 
b = 12,000 km and 6 = 60 deg. As 
a rule of thumb, the distance of clos- 
est approach is approximately 2000 
km less than b. The nominal trajec- 
tory was therefore designed to pass 
the planet at about 10,000 km from 
the center, or about 6600 km from 
closest approach to the surface. 
As it was extremely unlikely, how- 
ever, that the exact nominal aiming 
point could be achieved with one mid- 
course maneuver, it was necessary to 
decide how much error in the aiming 
point could be tolerated before a se-c- 
ond midcourse correction. 
Previous experience with Ranger 
and Mariner 2 had led to a high con- 
fidence in the ability to perform a 
midcourse correction maneuver suc- 
cessfully. Consequently, it was de- 
cided that a second midcourse maneu- 
ver would be attempted unless the 
trajectory followin the first maneu- 
ver passed throu8 Region 111, as 
indicated in the chart on page 31, 
bounded by TV and occultation FOM 
2 0.6. This region-somewhat larger 
c 
than Region 11, the prime aiming one 
-represents the tolerance acceptable 
in the first maneuver to avoid the use 
of a second. 
Midcourse-Guidance and Orbit-De- 
termination Results. To determine the 
probability that the spacecraft could 
pass through the prime aiming region, 
it was necessary to analyze the ac- 
curacy of the midcourse-guidance sys- 
tem and the associated radio tracking 
and orbit-determination processes. 
Preflight analysis indicated that the 
errors in executing the midcourse ma- 
neuver depended on three factors: 
1. The error in executing the mid- 
course maneuver was approximately 
proportional to the terminal error to 
be corrected, and hence directly de- 
pended on the injection error from the 
Atlas/Agena launch vehicle. The el- 
lipses shown in the chart at bottom 
represent the target dispersion of in- 
jection errors and the capability of 
the full midcourse-maneuver velocity 
increment to null these errors. Pre- 
flight analysis of injection errors and 
fuel loading has been covered in JPL 
reports.1-3 
2. The error depends on the toler- 
ances in the turns required by the 
spacecraft to orient the midcourse 
vector in the proper direction and on 
the resolution and shut-off errors in 
controlling magnitude of the maneu- 
ver. For simplicity and reliability, 
Mariner 4 uses a timer shut-off rather 
than more accurate integrating accel- 
erometer of Mariner 2 and Ranger, 
MIDCOURSE MANEUVER 
ERROR-DISPERSION ELLIPSES 
A. Primary. 
I 
B., 95% a priori. 
AIMING POINT AND ESTIMATED ACTUAL TARGET POINT 
240 270 300 
120 60 
3. The amount of error also de- 
pends on the uncertainty in the deter- 
mination of the actual trajectory the 
spacecraft is following. This causes 
an uncertainty in the amount of miss 
to be corrected by the midcourse 
maneuver. 
Preflight estimates were that with a 
15 m/s correction-corresponding to 
about 1-0 injection errors-the errors in 
executing the maneuver would be a 
l o  of about 4100 km and that the 
orbit-determination errors should be 
below 2250 km after 2 to 3 days of 
radio tracking. The root mean square 
of these error sources gives a lo error 
of about 4700 km. 
With this error model, it was found 
that the probability of hitting the 
prime aiming region was 0.85 with 
one maneuver. The chart at the top 
of this page shows the mapping of 
the spacecraft-maneuver errors into 
the aiming-point plane, with the 
ellipse representing the 0.95 probabil- 
ity bound; that is, 95% of a large 
number of maneuvers should fall with- 
in this region. 
Following the launch of Mariner 3, 
it was discovered that the aerodynamic 
nose fairing failed to separate. It was 
necessary to make extensive modifica- 
tions to the nose fairing before 
Mariner 4 could be launched. The 
time these modifications took intro- 
duced a danger of running outside the 
launch period. For this reason, it was 
decided to remove the Agena retro- 
rocket to reduce stage weight and 
hence extend the launch period a few 
days. This in turn necessitated biasing 
the launch aiming point about 600,000 
km (to insure that the Agena would 
~ 
maintain a 10-4 probability or less of 
impacting Mars-the purpose of the 
retrorocket). The new launch aiming 
point increased the expected size of 
the maneuver, but it still cgme within 
the correction capability of the space- 
craft propulsion system. 
Tracking Data. The NASA/JPL 
Deep Space Network (DSN), with 
stations at Goldstone, Calif., Johannes- 
burg, S.A., and Woomera and Can- 
berra, Australia, has tracked MA-4 
since launch (Canberra commenced 
tracking late in January). The DSN 
stations transmit a highly stable signal 
of approximately 2300 Mc to Mariner 
4, which multiplies it by a constant' 
and retransmits to Earth. 'The doppler 
shift is counted over evenly spaced 
intervals and divided by the intervaI 
to give an average doppler-frequency 
shift. All the DSN stations have atomic 
(rubidium) frequency standards for 
driving station equipment in trans- 
mission and reception. These fre- 
quency standards are stable to a few 
parts in 1012 over periods of one hour 
or more. The stations produce tracking 
data with very small high frequency 
noise levels and normally no detect- 
able bias due to equipment. 
Average doppler shift can be ex- 
pressed in terms of range rate meas- 
ured from the tracking station; for 
S-band stations, 16.5 cps equals 1 
m/sec. When the- doppler shift is 
counted over several hundred seconds 
to reduce cycle roundoff to a negligi- 
ble amount, the observed high-fre- 
quency noise is approximately 0.01 
cps-in velocity units, 0.6 mm/sec. 
Since the spacecraft velocity may 
range from 3-20 km/sec, the observed 
the maneuver results can be attributed 
to &IS source. 
All of the orbit runs listed in the 
two tables used the JPL Venus-bounce 
value for the AU: 149,598,500 2 500 
km. Since a B / a  AU = 0.6, the AU 
uncertainty produces an uncertainty 
in B of approximately 300 km. The 
accuracy of Mariner 4 ‘ s  AU solution 
should improve to less than 1000 km 
before encounter and with encounter 
tracking to 500 km or less. 
Conclusions. Mariner 4 should pass 
well inside the prime aiming zone, 
according to the current trajectory 
predictions, which the chart on page 
32 gives. The deviation from the 
nominal aiming point is currently es- 
timated to be 2400 km, approximately 
1000-km of which was caused by the 
change in the solar-pressure constant 
of the spacecraft. 
Here we might indicate the ac- 
curacy achieved to date by Earth- 
based radio guidance in the Ranger 
and Mariner series. Mariner 4, Mariner 
2, and Ranger 6, 7, 8, and 9 maneu- 
vers, in terms of miss from the nominal 
aiming point, gave these results: 
Mission A B, km 
Ranger 6 36 
Ranger 7 25 
Ranger 8 27 
Mariner 2 17,800 
Ranger 9 7 
Mariner 4 2430 
As a point of interest, a 1 m/s velocity 
increment in the most sensitive direc- 
tion can change a lunar trajectory 
about 200 km, a 1964 Mars trajectory 
20,000 km, and the 1962 Venus tra- 
jectory about 10,000 km. 
It can be seen from the table that 
the Ranger series and Mariner 4 
achieved results of about the same 
order. The Mariner 4 flight has again 
demonstrated the high accuracy that 
can be achieved by Earth-based radio 
guidance coupled with a single- 
impulse midcourse correction. 
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INJECTION DISPERSION VS. MIDCOURSE VELOCITY CAPABILITY 
noise represents computer noise for 
the single precision computer program 
(ODP) currently in use. 
Methods Used in Data Analysis.4--5 
The orbit-o' :termination method is 
based on the fact that computed 
values of the doppler observables can 
be obtained by numerically integrat- 
ing the equations of motion of the 
injected into an orbit passing about 
250,000 km from the planet-well 
within the correction capability of the 
midcourse system. In fact, the launch- 
vehicle errors gave dispersions which 
tended to cancel rather than enlarge 
the initial intentional bias, a fortunate 
circumstance. 
The table just below indicates the 
TABLE OF REAL-TIME PRE-MIDCOURSE SOLUTIONS 
Injection epoch on Nov. 28, 1964, at 15h 07" 57' GMT. All lengths in  kilometers. 
Last data Orbi t  B*Tc 
point (GMTI No. 
Nov. 28 ( 15'45"') I -224616. 
Nov.28 17'20"') 2 -231403. 
Nov.28 121'551"') 2 -224935. 
Nov.29 (0'21"') 4 -224160. 
Nov. 30 (05'14'") 5 -225039. 
Dec.4 (07h45m) 6 -224503. 
~~ 
'+Tc 
- 
3 1587. 
6161. 
1122. 
697. 
1201. 
1040. 
B*RC 
____. 
- 1  16215. 
- I  18516. 
- 122296. - 123342. 
- t2 1934. 
- I 2  1700. 
OB*RC TCA' UTCA. SM THETA.' 
July 17 see AAb deq 
12304. 0'10"' 8780 32270 168. 
3204. Oh43"' 2520 6772 24. 
530. 01'32"' 505 I128 7. 
735. Olh3Im 133 953 47. 
447. Olh31" 458 I220 169. 
415. 01'27'" 458 1079 164. 
~ ________ __ 
'Time of closest approach. 
bSMAA: The largest eigenvalue of uncertainties in the B plane. 
'THETA: Angle measured counterclockwise from the J axis to SMAA. 
spacecraft and by taking into account 
'the observation time, station coordi- 
nates, and speed of light. Partial de- 
rivatives of observables with respect 
to initial conditions are also available. 
These initial conditions can be in- 
cluded in the solution: 
1. Position and velocity at an initial 
epoch before the data being fit. 
2. Station locations with respect to 
the center of the Earth. 
3. Dynamical constants that affect 
the trajectory, including the astronom- 
ical unit (AU) ,  the masses of the 
Earth, Moon, Mars, and Venus, and 
spacecraft solar-pressure constant ( G )  . 
The observable and partial-derivative 
quantities are used in an iterative- 
weighted least squares procedure that 
adjusts the values of the initial condi- 
tions to make the weighted sum of 
squares of residuals between observed 
and computed data points a minimum. 
A priori information about the initial 
conditions is also treated as data and 
forms part of the quantity to be mini- 
mized. 
Flight Results. The first estimate of 
the actual spacecraft orbit, made 
about two hours after launch. in- 
dicated that the spacecraft had been 
refinement in the pre-midcourse de- 
termination of the actuaI Mariner orbit 
as additional tracking data became 
available. 
Orbits 1-4 were solved for only ini- 
tial position and velocity assuining 
other error sources negligible. This is 
the normal procedure during the first 
part of a mission to gain computing 
speed and solution stability, at the ex- 
pense of a slight inaccuracy in the 
\ 
solution and solution statistics. Orbits 
5 and 6 were solved for position, 
velocity, station locations, and dy- 
namic constants including the solar- 
pressure coefficient. 
The primary tool used to find re- 
quired midcourse conditions was the 
Midcourse Maneuver Operations Pro- 
gram, which used as input the latest 
trajectory estimates and certain mis- 
sion and spacecraft parameters. The 
maneuver was computed for execution 
on any one of seven days in early De- 
cember 1964. The study showed that 
all constraints would be satisfied on 
each of the days and that the maneu- 
ver magnitude slowly decreased as a 
function of time. 
The maneuver was executed on De- 
cember 5 at 6:35 a.m. PST. The space- 
craft was commanded to pitch 39.23 
deg, roll 156.08 deg, and then to im- 
part a velocity magnitude of 16.7 
m/sec. All systems operated well. 
The Mariner 4 maneuver used only 
about 19%.of the available fuel; and 
compared to preflight statistical analy- 
sis, the maneuver magnitude was 
nearly a lo case, in spite of the near- 
ly 2a injection error. 
Following the execution of the 
maneuver, the orbit redetermination 
process began. The table at bottom 
gives results for several orbits com- 
puted after the maneuver. 
In Orbits 6 and 7, it was possible 
to solve for the solar-pressure constant 
to about 2% accuracy, the solution 
differing from pre-midcourse estimates 
by about 5%. Two vanes mounted at 
the end of the spacecraft solar panels 
to aid in attitude control of the space- 
craft failed to deploy properly and are 
currently about 20 deg away from the 
position assumed before the maneuver. 
This appreciably increased the effec- 
tive area of the spacecraft facing the 
Sun and probably caused the 5% de- 
viation. Since a 5% solar-pressure 
change corresponds to a A B 1 1000 
km, at  least a portion of the error in 
TABLE OF REAL TIME POST-MIDCOURSE SOLUTIONS 
The maneuver occurred Dec. 5, 1964, at approximately 16' 07" GMT. 
Last data Orbit  E -TC aB*Tc B*RC OB-RC TCA" OTCA. SMAATHETA 
point (GMTI No. July 15, sec 
~~ ~ _- -~ - 
1965 
.._ -~ - - - -- 
- ~-  Maneuver Aiming Point (6007) (10401J ( 0  I '47"') 
Dec. 6 (Olh08m)b~c I 7237 13381 10555 6964 Olh13"' 2262 13672 13. 
Dec. 7 (0h05")b*c 2 6471 2106 9409 1604 O l h l I m  532 2194 221. 
Dec. 14 (22')' 3 6118 1374 11822 713 Ol'15'" 783 1456 159. 
Dec. 21 (05')' 4 6266 1118 11822 522 Olh14" 594 1177 161. 
Jan. 3 (23'))' 5 6784 860 11972 502 O l ' l I "  513 949 153. 
Jan. 23 6 7411 450 12303 441 01'03'" 386 587 134. 
7 7434 320 12519 210 0Ih03'" 161 349 161. Feb. 25 
'Time of closest approach. 
bComputations used information from pre-midcourse about position at time of command, 
while succeeding orbits do not. 
'Computations used a priori information about spacecraft solar-pressure constant, while 
others do not. 
___ ~ _ _  
__  -~ -~ 
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. 
Occultation Experiment 
By ARVYDAS J. KLIORE. DAN L. CAIN, GERALD S. LEVY, VON R. ESHLEMAN, 
F!?P.?!V E. DRAKE, 2nd BUNi4Aii FjEiDBO 
If successful, it will provide a fairly complete estimate of the Martian 
atmosphere and ionosphere, including data necessary for the de- 
sign of spacecraft to land on the planet's surface 
Improving our knowledge of the atmosphere and 
ionosphere of Mars has long been an important 
scientific objective of astronomers and other in- 
vestigators. Recently, the technological value of 
this knowledge has been greatly enhanced: More 
accurate information on the physical properties of 
the Martian atmosphere will be needed to design 
survivable landing capsules. These capsules will 
carry perhaps the most important experiments of 
planetary exploration-those in search of extra- 
terrestrial life. 
The present knowledge of such atmospheric 
properties as surface pressure and scale height is 
quite inexact. The surface pressure, as deduced 
from recent spectroscopic obser~ations,l-~ is 
thought to lie between 10 and 25 millibars, in 
contrast to the, 85-millibar figure previously de- 
rived from Rayleigh-scattering measurements. 
The vertical structure of the atmosphere, includ- 
ing the properties of the troposphere and the scale 
height in the stratosphere, are not accessible to 
direct Earth-based measurement, and can there- 
fore only be estimated on the basis of assump- 
tions of atmospheric constituents and tempera- 
tures. Likewise, the properties of the Martian 
ionosphere have been open only to postulation of 
models based in turn on the estimated structure 
of the Martian upper atmosphere. Current models 
indicate that the peak electron density might be 
between 10l1 and 2 X l O I 3  el./m3.4 
Direct measurement by means of an atmos- 
pheric entry capsule5 would provide most of the 
lacking information. However, such capsules are 
unlikely to be flown earlier than 1971, or 1969 at 
the earliest, and would probably come too late to 
provide information for design of lander capsules 
for the early biological experiments. Thus, the 
only opportunity to improve significantly knowl- 
edge of the atmosphere and ionosphere of Mars 
before these years will be offered by the occulta- 
tion experiment to be performed this month as 
the Mariner IV spacecraft passes Mars on July 14. 
Description of Experiment. Approximately one 
hour after its closest approach to Mars, the Mari- 
ner IV spacecraft will be occulted by the limb of 
the planet and will remain in occultation for 
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GEOMETRY OF OCCULTATION 
approximately 50 min. Immediately before and 
immediately following occultation, the spacecraft's 
2300-Mc tracking and telemetry signal will trav- 
erse the atmosphere and ionosphere of Mars. The 
changes caused in the frequency, phase, and am- 
plitude of the spacecraft's signal by passage 
through these media will constitute the raw data of 
the experiment. 
The idea of using a trajectory that would cause 
the spacecraft to be occulted by Mars was first 
advanced by investigators from Stanford Univ. 
primarily in connection with a proposed two fre- 
quency radio progagation measurement of the 
Martian ionosphere. Later, investigators from the 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory, aware of the refrac- 
tive effects of the Earth's atmosphere on the 
phase and frequency of spacecraft tracking sig- 
nals, concluded that changes in the phase, or 
frequency, of the doppler tracking signal caused 
by passage through the neutral atmosphere of 
Mars could be accurately measured and used to 
infer some of its physical properties. 
This conclusion was based on the demonstrated 
precision of the radio-tracking technique and 
the accuracy of the equipment of the NASA/JPL 
Deep Space Instrumentation Facility (DSIF). An- 
alysis of tracking data from the flights of Mariner 
I1 to Venus and the Ranger series of ] p a r  space- 
craft has provided significant improvements in the 
knowledge of the Earth-Venus mass ratio, the 
masses of Venus and the Moon, the Astronomi- 
cal Unit, and other physical constants of the 
solar system. 6 ,  The planetary radar experimentss 
have also produced significant results, as well as 
important advancements in the state of the art 
of space-communication systems. 
The present occultation experiment was pro- 
posed in the spring of 1964, and was subsequently 
accepted as an experiment on Mariner IV, with 
the authors comprising the investigator team. It  is 
interesting that only a change in the planned tra- 
jectory was needed to accommodate this addi- 
tional planetary experiment. Several of the team 
members had studied in detail the exfiected phase 
and frequency perturbations to the tracking sig- 
nals due to the neutral atmosphere of Mars, and 
the feasibility of making the required measure- 
m e n k 9  Other team members had included con- 
sideration,of the expected changes in signal ampli- 
tude and in limb diffraction oscillations due to 
3 
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the atmosphere, as well as possible ionospheric 
perturbations to the signals.1°-13 
A pictorial view of the geometry of occultation 
appears on page 73. The trajectory of the space- 
craft near Mars is shown in relation to the Earth- 
occultation region, a nearly cylindrical cone with 
the viewing station as the apex. The R-T plane is 
normal to the direction of the incoming asymp- 
tote s, and the vector locates the trajectory 
impact-point in the R-T plane. 
The chart at the top shows the location of 
the currently predicted (March 6, 1965) trajec- 
tory impact-point in the R-T plane. The cross 
indicates the pre-midcourse-correction aiming 
point, and the ellipses show the boundaries of the 
1-u and 3-0 orbit-determination uncertainties. The 
accuracy of the midcourse trajectory-correction 
maneuver is quite remarkable, as the total "miss" 
is only about 2500 km. Moreover, the predicted 
trajectory impact-point is so close to the center- 
line of the occultation contour, that the projection 
of the flight path, as seen from the Earth, will pass 
within about 300 km from the center of Mars. 
As the spacecraft approaches the occultation 
region, the presence of an ionosphere and atmos- 
phere will first cause the velocity of propagation 
of the radio signal to change from that in free 
space, owing to the non-unity effective index of 
refraction of the ionospheric and atmospheric 
medium. Secondly, the radial gradient in the effec- 
tive index of refraction will cause the radio beam 
to be refracted slightly from a straight line path. 
- -  
- -  
Both of these effects will cause the phase path of 
the signal at any time, t, to differ from what 
would be observed in the absence of an atmosphere 
and ionosphere by the amount, 
Ar(t) = J" nds - R(t) 
where n = index of refraction, r(t) = actual path 
taken by the refracted ray from the tracking sta- 
tion on Earth to the spacecraft at time t, and 
R(t) = straightline path to the spacecraft at time t. 
Thus, if the geometry of the spacecraft trajec- 
tory and the spatial characteristics of the index of 
refraction are known, the phase change can be 
computed readily. Conversely, if the geometry 
and the amount of phase change are known at 
any given time, the spatial characteristics of the 
index of refraction, and hence of the atmosphere 
and ionosphere, can be inferred by a process of 
inverting the above equation or by model-fit- 
After encounter, the trajectory of the space- 
craft relative to Mars at the time of occultation 
will be known very precisely. I t  is conservatively 
estimated that, by using current orbit-determina- 
tion techniques applied to two-way doppler track- 
ing data taken for 10 days before and 10 days 
after encounter, the range rate of the spacecraft 
will be determined with an accuracy of 0.0015 
m/sec. Thus, any significant deviation of the 
received doppler from predictions based on orbit 
determination will be caused by atmospheric and 
ionospheric phase effects. 
The magnitude of these effects has been com- 
puted for a simple isothermal model atmosphere. 
having a surface pressure of 25 millibars, a scale 
r f  t )  
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height of 14 km, and the ionosphere described by 
the graph on page 74. (This graph and the iono- 
sphere portions of the graphs shown on this page 
are adapted from a Stanford Univ. memorandum 
of June 6, 1964, by V. R. Eshleman, G. Fjeldbo, 
0. K. Garriott, and F. L. Smith 111.) This iono- 
sphere model is comprised of two Chapman layers 
with maximum electron densities of 6.7 X l o l l  
el/m3 at 460 km and 1.6X 10" at 205 km. This 
model is meant to illustrate several possible iono- 
spheric effects. While its exact shape does not 
result from a consideration of ionization reactions 
and other characteristics of a particular model 
atmosphere, the existence of several layers and 
a peak density on the order of 10l2 el/m3 is ex- 
pected from such considerations. Assuming a two- 
way pass through the ionosphere and atmosphere, 
the expected change in phase path will be as 
shown in the graph here at the right. The iono- 
sphere causes a considerable decrease in phase 
path (about 275 cycles at 165 sec to occulta- 
tion), which is later partially cancelled by the 
effect of the neutral atmosphere, acting during 
approximately the last 30 sec before occultation. 
The bottom graph at top shows corresponding 
change in range-rate doppler. Here the maxi- 
mum change (about 10 cycles/sec) is caused by 
the neutral atmosphere, and it occurs during the 
last 30 sec before occultation. 
It will be shown in a following section that the 
current tracking-data noise has a 3-0 magnitude 
of about 0.3 cps in doppler and less than 2 cycles 
in phase. This indicates that, even in the case of 
a very tenuous atmosphere and ionosphere, the 
the precision of the doppler-measurement tech- 
niques, and should yield not only the near-surface 
conditions, but also information on the vertical 
structure of the atmosphere and ionosphere. 
The focusing of the waves by the Martian 
atmosphere will cause changes in the amplitude of 
the signal transmitted from the spacecraft. The 
top graph shown at left illustrates the effect. 
This refraction attenuation would be a serious 
problem if its magnitude exceeded the available 
margin of signal level above threshold. However, 
it is anticipated that the margin available at Mari- 
ner IV encounter will be quite adequate to over- 
come refractive attenuation. In addition, there will 
be fluctuations in the amplitude in the vicinity of 
the shadow boundary due to diffraction at the 
planetary limb, as indicated in the graph on page 
77. The atmosphere affects the diffraction pat- 
tern by tending to stretch it out, increasing the 
period of the amplitude oscillations. This "Fresnel 
stretch" (F in the graph) is also a measure of the 
atmospheric refractive index at the surface. 
Refraction in the atmosphere tends to bend the 
propagation path around the limb of the planet. 
This effect is also shown in the graph, where AT 
is the time delay of signal extinction due to atmos- 
pheric refraction. The quantity AT can be calcu- 
lated from a measurement of the time that elapses 
between signal extinction and commencement, 
assuming that the radius of the planet is known 
with sufficient accuracy. 
Some signal power will also be reflected to- 
wards the Earth from the limb of the planet. There 
is no way of making an exact computation of the 
reflected power, since one does not know the 
shape and the electromagnetic properties of the 
surface at the limb. However, calculations based 
on a smooth limb show that the reflected part of 
, 
effects on phase and doppler will be well within \ 
TIM[ TO OCCULTATION. sec 
r the telemetry signal would be too weak to give 
rise to discrimination problems with the trajec- 
tory available for the 1965 occultation. The 
I! smooth-limb assumption is probably not very 
realistic; but a rough limb would usually be ex- 
pected to reflect even less power towards the 
Earth than would a smooth limb, since the effec- 
tive aperture is smaller due to shadowing and 
hemuse the scsttering is iio h g e r  coherent. 1 he 
conclusion should therefore remain the same. 
Besides the vertical profile shown in atmos- 
pheric-model graph on page 74, there might be 
important horizontal gradients in the electron- 
density distribution of the Martian ionosphere, and 
possibly also dense, sporadic E-type patches of 
ionization, similar to those found in the Earth’s 
lower ionosphere. If so, one may End that the 
ionosphere masks the lower neutral atmosphere, 
making it difficult to determine its physical charac- 
teristics near the surface of the planet. However, 
the rest of the data may be used to calculate the 
ionospheric electron-density profile, which, again, 
is related to the neutral constituents at ionospheric 
heights. In any event, it is expected that the occul- 
tation data will yield important new information 
about the Martian atmosphere. 
Instrumentation and Accuracy. The quantities 
to be measured at the DSIF receiver station dur- 
ing the occultation experiment will be frequency 
and signal strength as a function of time. These 
data will then be used to compute path attenua- 
tion and phase path change. To understand these 
measurements, it will be helpful to have a brief 
description of the DSIF radio system, including 
the special modifications for the experiment. The 
block diagram on page 77 depicts the system. 
The ground station uses a rubidium standard 
to drive a frequency synthesizer, which produces 
a signal of approximately 22 Mc. This signal is 
then modulated, multiplied 96 times in frequency, 
amplified, and transmitted to the spacecraft. Its 
radio system coherently translates the frequency 
and phase of the approximate 2.11-Gc received 
signal by the ratio of 240 to 221, yielding a car- 
rier frequency of approximately 2.297 Gc. When 
the spacecraft receiver is in lock with the ground- 
station signal, the 2.297 Gc signal is derived from 
the receiver’s voltage-controlled oscillator (VCO) , 
which is phaselocked to the received signal. When 
no uplink signal is received, however, the signal 
is derived from a free-running crystal oscillator in 
the spacecraft. The RF signal is amplified and 
transmitted from a high-gain spacecraft antenna. 
The ground transmitter and receiver system 
employs an 85-ft parabolic antenna with a 
Cassegrainian simultaneous-lobing feed. The rc- 
ceiver’s front end employs a traveling-wave maser 
cooled by a closed-cycle helium refrigerator oper- 
-. 
ating at about 3.2 K. After amplification by 
the maser, the signal is split into two separate 
receiver channels. The first channel consists of a 
triple-conversion phaselocked receiver. It is op- 
erated in the standard DSIF receiver configura- 
tion. This receiver’s VCO is kept in phase syn- 
chronism with the received signal. By a series of 
frequency multiplications, divisions, and additions, 
the transmitter exciter frequency is coherently 
compared to the receiver VCO to obtain the 
two-way doppler frequency. The receiver Auto- 
matic Gain Control (AGC), which is a received- 
signal power-level tracking servo. is 11c-J +- deter- 
DOPPLER SYSTEM 
mine received power level. Appropriate AGC 
voltages will be recorded on magnetic tape, and 
the doppler count will be digitized. This system 
will yield frequency and power information in 
real time. This channel is also used as the sum 
channel of the pointing system for the simultane- 
ous-lobing antenna. 
The second receiver channel-a manually tuned 
constant-gain, triple-conversion superheterodyne 
-is operated in a non-standard configuration. I t  
will simply amplify and frequency-translate the 
S-band input signal to the audio-frequency region 
of the spectrum and then record it on magnetic 
tape. The local-oscillator (LO) signals for this 
receiver will be derived from the rubidium fre- 
quency standard, which will drive a pair of syn- 
thesizers. The first synthesizer will produce a 
signal of approximately 23.4 Mc. This will be 
multiplied by 96 to produce the first LO at ap- 
proximately 2.245 Gc. This LO frequency will 
be periodically stepped to keep the signal in the 
receiver’s pass band. The second and third LOs 
will be derived from the second synthesizer oper- 
ating at 19.996 Mc. The output of the third 
mixer will have a pass band of 1-3 kc, which will 
be recorded on magnetic tape. The analog infor- 
mation on the magnetic tape will be digitized 
after the mission for use in a digital computer. 
“FRESNEL STRETCH” EFFECT 
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The DSlF doppler system, illustrated sche- 
matically on page 76, has the precision to give ac- 
curate measurements of phase path changes, from 
which the atmospheric parameters will be deter- 
mined; and the changes themselves are expected 
to be sufficiently large (perhaps 5-20 meters in 
the atmosphere alone) relative to equipment 
errors or Earth-atmosphere effects to permit both 
measurement and interpretation. 
The frequency of the standard must be stable 
during the round-trip transit time of the signal, 
since any drift will appear as a frequency bias at 
i the time of comparison. That drift will be small 
has been shown not only by laboratory tests, but 
monitoring of two-way doppler by a third station. 
Offsets of frequency, of the order of one part in 
1Oln, are typical; but the short-time variations, 
which are of interest, are much smaller-less than 
one part in 10’ I. 
The next contributing error is the unpredictable 
part of the Earth’s tropospheric and ionospheric 
effects. Unpredictability in both space and time 
are important. During the period of the round- 
trip transit time (24 min at occultation), the eleva- 
tion angle changes by 2.6 deg and the azimuth by 
3.6 deg. Thus the up and down rays sample differ- 
ent areas of the Earth’s atmosphere. Equally im- 
portant is thc fact that the time difference of 24 
min between up and down traversals of the Earth’s 
atmosphere allows temporal changes to take place. 
These will appear as phase biases in the data. 
However, it is only the changes in these biases, 
acting during the time of occultation effects (1 
min for the troposphere) that will affect the 
atmospheric estimates. These changes appear to 
be small. 
Equipment errors, such as phaselock errors and 
variable time-delays, will also affect the results. 
Development programs over the past 10 years 
have reduced equipment errors to a very low level. 
also through actual field tests using “passive” t 
. 
r 
The best over-all test for errors comes through 
comparison of the data with predictions based 
on the equations of motioI, of the spacecraft. The 
sample plot at bottom shows some results of 
phase-change data (integrated doppler) taken 
from actual tracking of the Mariner spacecraft on 
April 2, 1965, when its geocentric distance was 
about 72 X In6 km. The r ~ o t  mcaii square 
(rms) short-period fluctuation is about 2 cm- 
less than 1% of the expected signal, and the 3-a 
fluctuation is less than the two cycles shown in 
the graph at the bottom of page 75. 
The data from which these figures are derived 
is nondestructively counted doppler, using a 
sampling interval of 1 sec and multiplying the 
doppler frequency by a factor of eight before 
counting to improve resolution. The graph atop 
of page 79 shows a sample of the doppler resid- 
uals (observed minus predicted phase change in 
one second) resulting from such data. The .rms 
fluctuation is approximately 0.1 cps, leading to a 
3-0 noise value of about 0.3 cps, as shown in the 
second graph on page 75. 
Data Analysis. Analysis will depend somewhat 
upon the data obtained, and will probably be re- 
adjusted and developed during the next few years. 
The description here concerns procedures to be 
used in immediate post-flight reduction. 
A model-fitting technique will be used to ana- 
lyze the phase-doppler count data. That is, a 
complete physical-mathematical model for the 
k 
PHASE-ERROR SAMPLE 
data ill be assumed, except for the numerical 
mated. A weighted least-squares estimator will be 
used. Two separate stages will be involved. First, 
data will be used to estimate the orbit and mass 
of Mars, as well as other physical parameters not 
connected with Mars' atmosphere. Only data un- 
affected by Mars atmospheric and ionospheric in- 
fluence will be used in this stage. Second, the Mars 
atmospheric parameters will be estimated, but the 
doppler shifts and all other non-atmospheric effects 
in the data will be obtained from stage one. 
For the first stage, current orbit-estimation 
techniques will be used, but with special care to 
obtain maximum precision. For the second stage 
a special digital-computer program is being writ- 
ten. It has the following characteristics: 
1. Phase delays at the planet and through the 
Earth's atmosphere will be computed using ray- 
tracing techniques. Spherical layering will be 
assumed in both cases. The models will include 
constant-temperature-lapse-rate, isothermal, and 
piecewise-linear refractivity profiles, as well as a 
Chapman-layer ionosphere. 
2. Separate paths will be assumed for up-leg 
and down-leg, and movement of all bodies during 
signal transit time will be properly accounted for. 
3. Simplified Special Relativity corrections will 
be made. 
4. Current ephemerides of the Earth and Mars 
will be used. 
Val $" e of certain parameters, which will be esti- 
TIME, FROM 22h 44m 30' GMT, sec 
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